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Article 5

Leading Articles

A LEGAL-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF NEBRASKA
WATERCOURSE LAW
Clayton K. Yeutter*
I.

INTRODUCTION**

Nothing is more emotion packed than a discussion of ways and
means to allocate a resource that is essential to the maintenance of
human life. Yet the scarcity of water in many parts of our nation
makes such a discussion imperative. How else can strides be taken
in the direction of an equitable and efficient distribution of this
resource?
Our evolving national concern in this area is vividly illustrated
by the recent congressional passage of a bill establishing Water Research Institutes in every state.1 Each of these is expected to spend
$100,000 or more annually for research on various water problems.
Although Nebraska's landscape is dotted with innumerable
creeks and streams, the state's tremendous irrigation developments
have long since created water disputes and a legal system for
adjudicating them. This article will attempt to show that from a
legal-economic viewpoint at least some changes are long overdue.
I.

WATERCOURSE DEFINED

One cannot legitimately discuss watercourse law without knowing just what waters are encompassed therein. By statute, Nebraska defines a watercourse as "any depression or draw two feet
below the surrounding lands and having a continuous outlet to a
stream of water, or river or brook.' 2 But in applying this definition to specific situations, the Nebraska Supreme Court has necessarily amplified and clarified this short, precise statement. In so
doing the court has declared:
(1) that a watercourse must be a
B.S., 1952, University of Nebraska; LL.B., 1963, University of Nebraska.
Member of the Lincoln, Nebraska, and American Bar Associations. Instructor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska.
** This article published as paper No. 1662, Journal Series, Nebraska
Agricultural Experiment Station.
1 Water Resources Research Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 329 (1964).
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-202 (Reissue 1960).
*
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stream in fact, as distinguished from mere surface drainage; (2)
that it must have banks and sides; 4 and (3) that there must be a
definite channel flowing in a particular direction, 5 although flow
6
need not be constant.
Watercourse law applies to natural streams flowing in both
natural and artificial channels,7 and also to artificial streams or
drainage ditches. 8
III.

THE LEGAL DOCTRINES

Most of the thirty-one so-called humid eastern states operate
under the riparian doctrine of watercourse law. It basically provides that one who owns land contiguous to a stream has certain
rights of use 9 in the flow moving past or over his land.10 Domestic
uses are paramount, and a riparian can divert the entire flow if
needed for this purpose.:1 As to all other uses, a doctrine of reason3 Pyle v. Richards, 17 Neb. 180, 182, 22 N.W. 370, 371 (1885).
4

Jack v. Teegarden, 151 Neb. 309, 315, 37 N.W.2d 387, 392 (1949), citing
Morrison v. Bucksport & B.R.R., 67 Me. 353 (1877).
Ibid.

0 Ibid. See generally, Mader v. Mettenbrink. 159 Neb. 118, 65 N.W.2d
334 (1954); Cooper v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1, 146 Neb. 412, 19 N.W.2d 619
(1945).
7 Whipple v. Nelson, 143 Neb. 286, 291, 9 N.W.2d 288, 292 (1943), citing
Cloyes v. Middlebury Elec. Co., 80 Vt. 109, 66 Atl. 1039 (1907).
s Neb. Laws c. 277, pp. 832-33 (1963), amending NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-204

(Reissue 1960). In the past, watercourse law did not apply to artificial
streams. See Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Suburban Irr. Dist., 139 Neb. 333,
343, 297 N.W. 645, 651 (1941): "'There is a well-defined distinction
between artificial streams and natural streams in artificial channels.
Thus, riparian rights do not ordinarily attach to artificial streams in
artificial channels.'" Cf. Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines & Their Implications for River Basin Development, 22 LAW &

276, 282 (1957), where the authors state that an artificial watercourse, if subjected to long use and acquiescence by interested persons who have come to depend on it, may acquire all the
attributes of a natural watercourse. The Nebraska distinction was not
only administratively confusing, but also economically unsound.
9 Streamflow is owned by the state; individuals and firms obtain rights
of use to such flow but do not obtain ownership rights. See Farmers
& Merchants Irr. Co. v. Hill, 90 Neb. 847, 134 N.W. 929 (1912); Kirk v.
State Bd. of Irr., 90 Neb. 627, 631, 134 N.W. 167, 168-69 (1912): "In this
state, running water is publici juris. Its use belongs to the public and
is controlled by the state in its sovereign capacity."
CONTEMP. PROB.

10 Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines & Their Implications
for River Basin Development, 22 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 276, 278 (1957).

11 Ibid. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 371, 93 N.W. 781, 797
(1903).
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ableness is usually applied, meaning that the quantity taken by an
individual riparian must be reasonable in relation to the needs of
all other riparians on the stream. 2
The western or arid states have embraced the appropriation
doctrine. In it, rights to streamflow are obtained merely by diverting and using the water. Generally, the location and quantity of
diversion are controlled by a state water administrator, and often
the ultimate place of use is far removed from the stream. Earlier
permits have priority over those granted at a later date,
subject to
3
the requirement that the water be "beneficially used."'_
Nebraska is relatively arid in the west, relatively humid in the
east. As a consequence, both doctrines have evolved in the state,
posing a legal enigma that has endured for one hundred years. Because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying riparian
This is the rule in Nebraska, as first declared in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 352, 93 N.W. 781, 790 (1903): "The riparian proprietor
does not own the water. He has the right only to enjoy the advantage
of a reasonable use of the stream as it flows by his land, subject to a
like right belonging to all other riparian proprietors." Crawford is
one of the leading cases on riparian law in the United States.
The most comprehensive discussion of the reasonable use rule in
Nebraska, however, is provided in Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 513-15,
93 N.W. 713, 718 (1903), where the court said: "The purpose of the law
is to secure equality in the use of the water by riparian owners, as near
as may be, by requiring each to exercise his rights reasonably and with
due regard to the right of other riparian owners to apply the water to
the same or to other purposes."
In recognizing that reasonableness is a question of fact the court
stated: "[I]f we regard the question of what is reasonable use as in
great part one of fact, the condition of soil, climate, and rainfall in any
given locality, when proved, may be considered properly as important
elements of fact, without in the least affecting the general rule....
The uses which an upper riparian may make of a stream for purposes
of irrigation must be judged, in determining whether they are reasonable, with reference to the size, situation, and character of the stream,
the uses to which its waters may be put by other riparian owners, the
season of the year, and the nature of the region .... Some things,
however, are clearly unreasonable, and it may be laid down absolutely
that the upper owner, in using the water for irrigation, must not waste,
needlessly diminish, or wholly consume it, to the injury of other owners, nor so as to prevent reasonable use of it by them also." Id. at 51516, 93 N.W. at 718.
IsSee discussion of the Nebraska appropriation statutes in section IV
infra. See also Bagley, Some Economic Considerations in Water Use
Policy, 5 KA_. L. REv. 499, 505 (1957); Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water
Rights Doctrines & Their Implications for River Basin Development,
22 LAw & CoNTEsmr. PROB. 276, 279 (1957); Larson, Development of
Water Rights & Suggested Improvements in the Water Law of North
Dakota, 38 N.D.L. REv.243, 249 (1962).
12
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14
rights, litigation has been inevitable.
Similar riparian-appropriation conflicts in other states have
been legislated out of existence. This has been achieved by statutes
providing for the recognition of riparian rights only to the extent
that water is being used at time of passage, or to the extent that
construction preparatory to such use is completed within a specified period. 15 Nebraska, on the other hand, has reached the same
result by means of judicial legislation. 6

Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903), and Clark
v. Cambridge &Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W.
239 (1895), are two of the foremost cases involving the riparian-appropriation conflict. In Crawford it was said: "To adopt the [appropriation] doctrine . .. would be a most violent and radical departure from
the trend of judicial decisions heretofore prevailing, and would overturn many well-settled and generally accepted principles respecting
property rights, and result in an invasion of vested private property interests which is beyond the lawful power of the court or the Legislature.
To say there is no such thing as a property right of a riparian owner
to the use of the stream flowing along or by his land is to work a
revolution in the jurisprudence of the state, and violate fundamental
principles which lie at the very foundation of the system." 67 Neb. at
334-35, 93 N.W. at 784.
15 North Dakota has limited riparian rights to domestic and stockwatering
14

purposes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (1960).

Kansas provides that, subject to vested rights, all waters in the
state may be appropriated for beneficial use. "Vested right" is defined
as the right to continue the use of water that had been beneficially
applied prior to the 1945 act or within a reasonable time thereafter
with the use of works then under construction. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 82a-701 (Supp. 1961). This act was upheld in Baumann v. Smrha,
145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956);
and in State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).
The earliest such statute was passed in Oregon in 1909. ORE. REV.
STAT. § 539.010 (1963). Its provisions were used as precedent in the
Kansas act. The Oregon statute was upheld in In re Hood River, 114
Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065 (1925).
South Dakota followed the Kansas statute except that vested rights
were limited to the beneficial use of water actually made at the time
of enactment of the statute or within the immediately preceding three
years, or to the beneficial use of water with works then under construction if they were completed and water applied within a reasonable time
thereafter. Domestic use is not to be restricted in any way. S.D. CODE
§ 61.0102(7) (Supp. 1960). The Model Water Use Act § 303 in UNIVERSITY OF MIcHIGAN LAW

SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES

&

THE LAW

566

(1958), is almost identical to the South Dakota law.
See Hutchins, Riparian-AppropriationConflicts in the Upper Midwest, 38 N.D.L. REV. 278, 289-301 (1962) for an excellent commentary
on all the above statutes and on the Nebraska cases dealing with this
subject.
16 See King, Regulation of Water Rights Under the Police Power, in
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES & THE LAW

321
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The Nebraska court struck its first blow at riparian rights by
holding that a prior ripariancould not enjoin a subsequent appropriator from diverting water from a stream.1 7 Later, the court
18
held that a prior appropriatorcould enjoin a subsequent riparian.
And finally, by dicta, it even said that a subsequent appropriator
19 In
could probably enjoin a prior riparian.
each instance, the riparian's only recourse was an action for damages. But even this
was of little consolation, since the court quietly added that damages
might well be only nominal. 20
Though the court spoke of protecting vested rights in each of
the above cases, quite obviously for all practical purposes it destroyed them. Nevertheless, such action was a boon to future water
development in the state. It forced riparians seeking a secure water supply to obtain appropriation permits. Having only one active
legal doctrine in the state has reduced litigation and greatly simplified the administration of its watercourse law.
A. THE EXISTmG RiPAi DOCTRINE
With respect to the vestiges of riparian rights that still exist in
Nebraska, the following rules apply: 21
(1) The doctrine is in full force and effect, except as modified
22
by statute.

17

18

(1958). The United States Supreme Court came to the same conclusion
in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945).
Cline v. Stock, 71 Neb. 79, 102 N.W. 265 (1905), reversing on rehearing
71 Neb. 70, 98 N.W. 454 (1904). See also Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W. 239 (1895).
McCook Irr. & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249

(1905), reversing on rehearing70 Neb. 109, 96 N.W. 996 (1903).
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 123, 102 N.W. at 252. The court stated: "Whether the defendants
have suffered any substantial damages to their riparian estates by reason of their being denied the reasonable use of the water of the stream,
when such use interferes with plaintiff's appropriation, is problematical
and must depend upon the state of proof .... This right may prove
to be so infinitesimal that the law would not take note of it. The
damages may be nominal only. Whether the right to damages in such
a case, if it exists, is to be claimed and enforced, must, we think, in a
large measure, rest with the riparian owner where lands have thus been
injuriously affected. Under such circumstances, it does not seem inequitable to remand the riparian owner to his remedy by an action
at law for the recovery of whatever damages he has sustained by reason
of such appropriation."
21 These are summarized very briefly since a thorough dissertation on
the subject can be found in Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 NEB.
L. REv. 1 (1941), with follow-up in 29 NEB. L. REy. 385 (1950).
22 Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Miller, 12 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1926); Drainage

16
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23
(2) Streamflow may be used only on riparian lands.
(3) Riparian lands are limited to those obtained by original
patent from the
government, less any portions thereof subsequently
24

conveyed out.

(4) Domestic purposes, for which all flow may be diverted,
are limited to items concerned with the sustenance of life-drink25
ing, cooking, and watering stock.
(5) The reasonable use doctrine, applicable
to nondomestic
26
diversions, is a question of fact and circumstances.
(6) Riparians own the beds of all streams to the thread, 27 and
Dist. No. 1 v. Suburban Irr. Dist., 139 Neb. 460, 298 N.W. 131 (1941);
Slattery v. Harley, 58 Neb. 575, 79 N.W. 151 (1899).
See Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 NEB. L. REV. 1, 18 n.110 (1941).
24 In Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 355, 93 N.W. 781, 791 (1903),
the court assumed, without deciding, that riparian rights would attach
to forty acre tracts patented by the government. But then in McGinley
v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 132 Neb. 292, 298, 271 N.W.
864, 866-67 (1937), it permitted a riparian to recover damages on a 640
acre tract in a western Nebraska ranch. The court conceded that extending the right to a section was done more or less arbitrarily, but
chiefly because it had been possible to acquire this amount by government patent in that part of the state. Cf. McCook Irr. & Water Power
Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 109, 112, 96 N.W. 996, 997 (1903), which intimated that riparian rights would not attach to the quantity of land patented if the reasonable use doctrine would dictate otherwise.
25 Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 371, 93 N.W. 781, 797 (1903).
But dicta in Norman v. Kusel, 97 Neb. 400, 150 N.W. 201 (1914), indicated that the watering of 309 head of cattle constituted a domestic use.
Cf. Neb. Laws c. 279, p. 835 (1963), in which domestic use of ground water is defined as "all uses . . . required for human needs as it relates
to health, fire control, and sanitation and shall include the use of
ground water for domestic livestock as related to normal farm and
ranch operations."
23

26

See note 12 supra.

27

McBride v. Whitaker, 65 Neb. 137, 90 N.W. 966 (1902), aff'd, 197 U.S.
510 (1905), specifically held that each riparian proprietor owns that
portion of the bed of a nonnavigable river which is adjoining his land
to the thread or center line of the stream. Id. at 155, 90 N.W. at 968.
There has never been any controversy on this point in Nebraska. But
McBride also stated the common law rule that riparians bordering on
navigable streams would own the land only to the high water mark;
beyond this it is the property of the state. This was followed in Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 579, 104 N.W. 1061, 1064 (1905). But the
Kinkead opinion on rehearing intimated that the public may only have
a right of passage along and over navigable rivers. Id. at 589, 109 N.W.
at 745. The latter view was adopted without question in Thies v.
Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 137 Neb. 344, 289 N.W. 386
(1939).
The Republican River was declared nonnavigable in Clark v.
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the beds of lakes to the center.28
(7) The public is entitled to a right of passage on the Missouri
River, the state's only navigable stream.2 9
(8) A riparian's boundary is changed by accretion and reliction, but not by avulsion.3 0
(9) Flood waters are subject to riparian rights unless separated from a stream so as never to return.3 1
Cambridge & Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 805, 64
N.W. 239, 241 (1895), and the Platte in Stubblefield v. Osborn, 149
Neb. 566; 574, 31 N.W.2d 547, 552 (1948). Navigability of the Missouri
was recognized in Kinkead v. Turgeon, supra at 586, 109 N.W. at 746.

28

United States v. Phillips, 56 F.2d 447 (D. Neb. 1931).

Thies v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 137 Neb. 344, 346, 289
N.W. 386, 387 (1939).
30 The riparian's land holdings increase by virtue of accretion and reliction. With accretion, this is due to alluvial formations resulting either
from siltation or from a gradual and imperceptible change in the channel of the stream. Higgins v. Adelson, 131 Neb. 820, 270 N.W. 502
(1936). Since the riparian owns to the thread of the stream, his holdings change whenever the stream shifts. Reliction is merely the uncovering of land by a gradual subsidence of the water. Krimlofski
v. Matters, 174 Neb. 774, 119 N.W.2d 501 (1963).
There is one exception to the accretion rule. Where the stream
changes course, not by excavating, passing over, and then filling the
intervening place between the old and new channel, but rather flows
around the intervening land, with the proportion of the flow going
into the new channel gradually increasing from year to year until the
new channel becomes the principal stream, the boundary line remains
in the old channel, subject to accretion changes on it so long as it
continues to flow. Commissioners of Land Office v. United States,
270 Fed. 110 (8th Cir. 1920).
In avulsion, there is a sudden and rapid change in the channel of
the stream. The old channel is completely abandoned and a new one
formed. In such a situation, the court deems it unfair to extend thd
holdings of one riparian at the expense of another and, therefore, the
boundaries are left where they existed prior to the avulsion. Frank v.
* Smith, 138 Neb. 382, 293 N.W. 329 (1940). One riparian may also gain
at the expense of another in accretion, but apparently the courts have
felt that a gradual shift is not particularly detrimental to the losing
landowner. In addition, the practical problem of crossing a river to
use an exceptionally small plot of ground is avoided.
It has proven exceedingly difficult to distinguish avulsion from
accretion in practice and much litigation has resulted. See generally,
Heider v. Kautz, 165 Neb. 649, 87 N.W.2d 226 (1957); State v. Ecklund,
147 Neb. 508, 23 N.W.2d 782 (1946); Yearsley v. Gipple, 104 Neb. 88,
175 N.W. 641 (1919); Gill v. Lydick, 40 Neb. 508, 59 N.W. 104 (1894).
31 Murphy v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 101 Neb. 73, 161 N.W. 1048 (1917), is a
leading case on this point; accord, Bahm v. Raikes, 160 Neb. 503, 70
N.W.2d 507 (1955); Cooper v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1, 146 Neb. 412, 19
N.W.2d 619 (1945).
29
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B. THE APPROPRIATION DocTRNE
Though the appropriation doctrine developed during the California gold rush, Nebraska did not give it statutory recognition
until 1877.32 The legislature then authorized the formation of corporations to develop irrigation or water power, and gave such corporations the power of eminent domain to permit the construction
of canals, dams and reservoirs. Water rights were not mentioned,
but the state supreme
court held that they were necessarily im33
plied in the law.
In 1889, the legislature extended the earlier statute by providing that anyone owning land on the banks or in the vicinity of a
stream could acquire a water right by putting the streamflow to
beneficial use.3 4 Riparian rights were given passing recognition by
virtue of a provision that the rights of a riparian on streams not
more than fifty feet wide were not to be affected by the act. In
1893, this was amended so as to apply only to streams not more than
twenty feet wide.35
A comprehensive water code was finally enacted in 1895. The
legislature provided that "the water of every natural stream not
heretofore appropriated . ..is hereby declared to be the property
of the public, and is dedicated to the use of the people of the
state . . . ."3 This meant that the only water rights that would
attach to land not yet in private ownership in the state would be
appropriation rights.
The riparian doctrine thus applies only to land held in private
ownership prior to 1895.
Since such rights are minimal, more
attention can and should be given to the modus operandi of the
appropriation system.
The 1889 act was supposedly self-administered. To acquire an
appropriation right, it was necessary only to post notice of the intended diversion, undertake construction of the diversion works
within sixty days, and prosecute construction diligently. No period
was prescribed by which the works should be completed and in use.
In addition, appropriation rights were recognized for diversions
32 Neb. Laws p. 168 (1877).

33 Kearney Water and Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irr. Dist., 97 Neb. 139,
149 N.W. 363 (1914).
34 NEB. COMP. STAT. C. 93a, at 844 (1889).

35 NEB. COMP. STAT. C. 93a, § 1, at 844 (1893).
36 NEB. COMP. STAT. C. 93a, § 5485, at 1109 (1895).
(Emphasis added.)
This is now NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-203 (Reissue 1960).
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prior to 1889 to the extent of the capacity of the diversion works.37
The act of 1895 established, for the first time, an agency
charged with the responsibility of protecting the public interest in
administering the appropriation doctrine. It was called the State
Board of Irrigation. The board was to: (1) determine and record
priorities on a "first in time is first in right" basis; (2) determine
the amount of appropriations, which could not be more than: (a)
the capacity of the diversion works, (b) the amount that could be
beneficially used for the purpose for which the appropriation was
made, and (c) one cubic foot per second for each seventy acres of
land included in the application; and (3) measure streamflow in the
state to determine the amount of water available for appropriation.
Applications were to be granted if to do so would not be detrimental
to the public interest. In 1911, the board was given the right to
annul, after notice and hearing, any appropriation which had not
38
been used for more than three years.
The functions of the above board are now carried out by the
Department of Water Resources.39 Although minor changes have
been made through the years, the basic statutes of today are those
which were enacted in 1895. Discussion of the major provisions

follows.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
A. GENEiAL Du=S
This agency has full responsibility for the administration of
Nebraska's watercourse statutes.4 0 In so doing it adopts procedural
rules and conducts public hearings on complaints, petitions, and
applications in connection with water rights. The department is
authorized to compel the attendance of witnesses, take testimony
by deposition, examine books and records of parties, etc. 41 At the
conclusion of its hearings, a decision is rendered and orders are
issued. A dissatisfied party may appeal to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, which may reverse, vacate, or modify the orders. 42
Quite obviously the powers of this department are quasi-judi-

37

See Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv. 385, 387 (1950),

38

Neb. Laws c. 153, § 6797, p. 503 (1911).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-208 (Reissue 1960).
NaB. REV. STAT. § 46-209 (Reissue 1960).

on this point and for a general discussion of early appropriation law.

39
40

41 Ibid.
42

NEB. REv.

STAT.

§ 46-210 (Reissue 1960).

20
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cial in nature.43 This immediately makes them suspect on consti44
tutional grounds relative to the doctrine of separation of powers.
The supreme court, however, decisively resolved this issue in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway 45 by holding that the primary object of the
department is to supervise the appropriation, distribution, and diversion of water. This, said the court, is an administrative function.
Though the department's powers are quasi-judicial, it is not a judicial body and does not exercise judicial functions. The right of the
judiciary to overturn department orders is sufficient to furnish an
aggrieved party with due process of law.
The department's orders are clothed with a presumption of
validity and are final unless unreasonable or arbitrary. 46 The
hesitancy of courts to interfere with such orders stems from a realization, first, that most department decisions are administrative and
factual in nature, and, second, that this is a complex, specialized
area into which the judiciary, with good reason, often fears to tread.
B.

APPLICATIONS FOR APPROPRIATIONS

By statute, an appropriation applicant in Nebraska must furnish the following information to the Department of Water Resources:
(1) Name and address;
(2) The source from which the appropriation is to be made;
(3) The amount of water desired;
(4) The location of the proposed diversion works;
(5) The estimated time for completion of the diversion works
and canals;
43

44
45
46

See Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 113 N.W.2d
617 (1962); North Loup River Pub. Power & Irr. Dist. v. Loup River
Pub. Power Dist., 162 Neb. 22, 74 N.W.2d 863 (1956); State v. Oliver
Bros., 119 Neb. 302, 228 N.W. 864 (1930).
Texas held a similar statute unconstitutional. Board of Water Eng'rs v.
McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301 (1921).
67 Neb. 325, 365, 93 N.W. 781, 795 (1903).
State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 173, 292 N.W. 239, 246
(1940); accord, Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 176 Neb. 416,
126 N.W.2d 404 (1964); Ainsworth Irr. Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 102
N.W.2d 416 (1960).
In Kirk v. State Bd. of Irr., 90 Neb. 627, 632, 134 N.W. 167, 169
(1912), it was pointed out that this agency is made the guardian of the
public welfare in the appropriation of the public waters of the state,
and that this necessarily devolves upon it a large discretion in such
matters.
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The estimated time by which water can be applied for
beneficial purposes; and
(7) The purpose of the appropriation:
(a) If for irrigation, a description of the land to be irri47
gated and amount thereof.
The department immediately records the application and examines it for patent defects. Should it be defective, it is returned
to refile and still
to the applicant, who has thirty days in which
48
retain the priority date of the original filing.
If there is unappropriated water in the source of supply, 4 and
if such appropriation would not be detrimental to the public welfare, the Department of Water Resources approves it by endorsement on the application and return to the applicant. If it so desires,
the department may lessen the quantity of water approved for
withdrawal.5 0
Within six months after the approval, the applicant must file
with the Department of Water Resources a map or plat showing
the point of diversion from the stream, and all proposed dams,
reservoirs, canals, and other structures involved in the project. If
this is not accomplished, the appropriation is forfeited. 51
(6)

The applicant must likewise begin construction of his diversion
works, canals, etc., within six months after approval of his applica47

NEB.

REV. STAT.

§ 46-233 (Reissue 1960).

The Nebraska court has said that an appropriation is not completed
until water is actually applied to some beneficial purpose. North Loup
River Pub. Power & Irr. Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 162 Neb.
22, 74 N.W.2d 863 (1956); accord, State ex rel. Lackey v. Gering & Ft.
Laramie Irr. Dist., 129 Neb. 48, 260 N.W. 568 (1935); Commonwealth
Power Co. v. State Bd. of Irr., 94 Neb. 613, 143 N.W. 937 (1913). Power
appropriations, on the other hand, are completed when the necessary
facilities are constructed and the plants placed in operation. Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 176 Neb. 416, 126 N.W.2d 404
(1964).
49 A side issue here is whether return flow from a prior grant is subject
to further appropriation. In Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States,
269 Fed. 80, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1920), it was held that seepage is abandoned
by the original appropriator when permitted to return to its natural
channel with no intention on the part of the appropriator to recapture
it. If not abandoned, recapture and re-use is permitted. Once abandoned, it can nevertheless be recaptured and re-used if no new rights
have intervened in the interim. The same rules apply to waste water.
Ramshor was followed in United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850 (8th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 691 (1942).
50 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-235 (Reissue 1960).
51 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-237 (Reissue 1960).

48
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tion. The statute requires him to prosecute such construction
"vigorously, diligently, and uninterruptedly." Within six months,
the applicant must furnish a report to the department showing the
amount of work remaining and satisfactory evidence that work has

begun. At least one-tenth of the work must be completed within
a year. The department has the right to physically examine the
progress of the work to insure that it is being accomplished according to plans and specifications, and with due diligence. 52 Failure to

comply with this provision will void the earlier approval.

To the basic 1895 quantity limitation of one c.f.s. for seventy
(1) that
acres of land, the legislature added further restrictions:
the aggregate annual amount could be no more than three acre-feet
of water for each acre of land; and (2) that the appropriation could
not exceed the quantity that experience might indicate as neces-

the exercise of good husbandry, for the production of
sary, 5in
3
crops.
Additional appropriations are permitted under certain circumstances. For example, an irrigator may have a perfected appropriation of one c.f.s. for each seventy acres, and yet have so many
appropriations senior to his that he obtains little or no water in
times of scarcity. Such a person (or firm) may apply for an additional appropriation from any natural lake or reservoir. 54 le may
not apply for an additional appropriation from another stream.
Many irrigators have appropriations of less than one c.f.s. per
seventy acres. These persons may apply for additional or supplemental appropriations that will make their rights the maximum
permitted by law.55 This latter appropriation, however, is not
retroactive, but will have priority only from the date of filing such
application with the Department of Water Resources.
C.

STORAGE APPROPRIATIONS

Anyone intending to construct a storage reservoir must receive approval from the Department of Water Resources. 56 Subsequent to approval, the applicant may impound unappropriated
streamflow, and any appropriated flow not required for immediate
use. Ditches necessary to conduct the water to the reservoir may,

53 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-238 (Reissue 1960).
§ 46-231 (Reissue 1960).

54 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-240 (Reissue 1960).

52 NEB. REV. STAT.

55 NEB. REV. STAT. §
56 NEB. REV. STAT.

46-240.01 (Reissue 1960).

§ 46-242 (Reissue 1960).
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of course, also be constructed, and property may be condemned
for both the ditches and the reservoir.
Water cannot be impounded for a reservoir when needed by
another reservoir with a senior appropriation. Nor can it be impounded when needed by irrigators who have appropriations direct from the stream in question, even if such appropriations are
57
junior to that of the reservoir.
After a reservoir is completed, the owner thereof must, within
six months, apply for a permit to put the stored water to beneficial
use.58 If for irrigation, the land to be irrigated must be described.
The individual landowners who are to be served by such a project
do not apply for appropriations. Thus, under ordinary circumstances, the department issues only one appropriation for each
reservoir. The quantity is limited to three acre-feet annually for
each acre of land served. Presumably the owner of the reservoir
could furnish either more or less than such amount to a specific
landowner, so long as the total withdrawal would not consist of
more than three acre-feet per acre per year.r9
Similarly, irrigation districts obtain only one appropriation for
all irrigators to be served. They too can distribute the total allowable quantity of water in any manner they wish. The Department
of Water Resources supervises the total withdrawal by the district
and by a reservoir owner, but does not monitor in any way the
distributional procedures of these entities.

D. LANDS

TO BE IMUGATED

Prior to the first of April of each year, a list of all lands to be
irrigated under each appropriation must be submitted to the De57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 A similar three acre-feet per acre limitation is found in NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-231 (Reissue 1960). But that section explicitly decrees that such
limitation shall not apply to storage waters. The apparent inconsistency should be rectified by the state legislature so that the Department
of Water Resources will know whether or not to enforce the restriction.
Some post-1895 storage projects are now diverting more than three
acre-feet per acre. See summary of acreage reports in STATE OF NEBRASKA, DEPARTimENT OF WATER REsouRcEs, HYDROGRAPHIC REPORT 13738 (1961-62).
This leads to an additional and even more serious question: Is it
possible under Nebraska law to obtain a three acre-feet storage appropriation in addition to a three acre-feet natural flow appropriation? A
legislative answer is needed so that the Department of Water Resources

will have legal guidance in the matter.
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partment of Water Resources.60 This section has a three-fold purpose: (1) to insure that appropriators stay within the maximum
quantity limitations prescribed by statute; (2) to furnish the department with evidence for subsequent forfeiture proceedings; and
(3) to permit the department to estimate potential use for the season and pre-plan to minimize waste.
The provision is subject to criticism on at least two grounds.
First, it assumes that an application of water in excess of the
maximum statutory allowance will be wasteful. Later in this article economic analysis will be used to show that this is not necessarily true. 61 Second, most irrigators are cognizant of the forfeiture
potential of this provision, and can circumvent it by merely reporting the maximum acreage each year. The department has neither
the funds nor the personnel to insure that they actually irrigate
this acreage. Since the figure submitted is only an estimate, and
since water needs depend to a great degree on climatic factors, it
would be virtually impossible to prove fraud in such a case even
though the department recognizes that many appropriators consistently irrigate far fewer acres than are estimated on April 1. A
suggested change in this procedure is discussed in section V (E)
infra.
E. ADMINISTRATVE PENALTIES
Should an irrigator, for any reason, receive more water than
that quantity to which he is entitled, he must take steps to prevent
such excess distribution. 2 Generally, this will require notification
of the owner of the canal which is servicing him. Failure to
promptly make such notification places the irrigator in a position
of being liable to anyone injured thereby.
Anyone interfering with the proper and lawful delivery of water under an appropriation is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject
to a fine of $100 or imprisonment for thirty days.6 3
Anyone tampering with a gauge used for determining the
flow of a stream or canal is guilty of a felony 6and
subject to a fine
4
of $1,000, imprisonment for six months, or both.

60 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-262 (Reissue 1960).

61 See section V(B) infra.
62 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-262 (Reissue 1960).
63 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-263 (Reissue 1960).
64 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-263.01 (Reissue 1960).

NEBRASKA WATERCOURSE LAW
F.

STORED FLOODWATERS

In 1902, Congress authorized the formation of a Bureau of Reclamation, the purpose of which was to reclaim arid lands of the west.
Much of the Bureau's work has been concentrated on the development of irrigation. The larger projects have, however, been multipurpose in nature involving flood control, hydroelectric power, and
navigation, along with irrigation. Where quantities of water in excess of the needs of the project are stored, or flood water accumulated, the federal government may contract to furnish such excess
water to appropriators on the stream if the flow at that particular
time is inadequate. The Department of Water Resources is charged
with supervising and enforcing the distribution of such water. 6
Contracts executed by the federal government and the appropriators must immediately upon execution be furnished to the department.
G.

CoNDIrION OF DAms

The Department of Water Resources is required to make an
annual inspection of all dams having a capacity of ten acre-feet or
more. 66 Should the inspection reveal an unsafe condition, notice
thereof is given the owner, who has three months in which to correct the defect. Failure to make such repair constitutes a misdemeanor subjecting the owner to a fine of up to $100. Each day
of delay subsequent to the three month limit constitutes a separate
offense.
V. NEBRASKA WATERCOURSE LAW-ITS CHARACTERISTICS & PROBLEMS
This article has been devoted thus far to an elucidation of the
principles of riparian and appropriation law applicable to Nebraska
watercourses. The presentation has been legalistic, and primarily
descriptive rather than analytical. The tenor will now change, and
the remainder of the article will critically appraise several specific
characteristics of the state's watercourse law.
This critique is based on the premise that the people of Nebraska desire an efficient, economic use and allocation of the state's
water resources. Is the 1895 appropriation statute imbued with this
premise? The Nebraska Supreme Court apparently thought so
when, in FarmersCanal Co. v. Frank,it said:
65 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-273 (Reissue 1960).
66 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-277 (Reissue 1960).
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It is the evident purpose of the law . . . to enforce and maintain a rigid economy in the use of the waters of the state. It...
is the policy of the law in all the arid states ... to require and enforce an economical use of the waters of the natural streams. The
urgent necessities of the situation compel this policy by the very
force of circumstances. One of the main objects of the system of
administration of public waters prescribed throughout the arid regions is to restrain unnecessary waste, and to provide for an economic distribution of that element so necessary to the very existence
of agriculture in those regions. This is also the policy of the state
of Nebraska in its regulation of the use of the waters of the state,
and the law should be construed so as to effect a reasonable, just
and economic distribution of water for irrigation purposes. The
court will take judicial notice of the fact that there are hundreds of
acres within the state susceptible of irrigation to every acre which
there is water enough to supply, and it is obvious that a construction of the law that will best distribute the use of the waters is to
be preferred, if such construction
67 is not inimical to any constitutional inhibitions or limitations.
It has been said that the appropriation doctrine often exhibits
waste in: (1) quantity diverted; (2) location of use; and (3) purpose of use.68 The discussion to follow will show that Nebraska,
unfortunately, has glaring examples in each category.
A.

ANcIENT VESTED APPROPRIATION RIGHTS

Since the Nebraska Supreme Court has given legal, if not actual
or practical, protection to riparian rights in the state, consistency
would seem to demand that early appropriation rights be given similar protection. The court has provided that consistency.
72 Neb. 136, 159, 100 N.W. 286, 294 (1904); accord, State v. Birdwood
Irr. Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 46 N.W.2d 884 (1951); Enterprise Irr. Dist. v.
Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939); Kearney Water & Elec.
Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irr. Dist., 97 Neb. 139, 149 N.W. 363 (1914). In
the Birdwood case the court said that it was the duty of the department
to insure that the maximum amount of water may be subject to appropriation.
08 Fisher, Western Experience & Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in THE
LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 75, 95
(1958): "The problems of waste in western law may be classified in
three fairly distinct but somewhat overlapping groups. They presume
a situation of limited water supplies from which a high level of beneficial use is desirable. First, given the place and purpose of a particular
use, the amount of water diverted for it is frequently excessive and
wasteful. Second, given the purpose of a particular use, its location
is often such that the same purpose of use at another place would require a smaller amount of water. Third, even though the location and
the amount used are appropriate for the particular purpose to which
water is being applied, this purpose may be such that the same amount
of water used for a different purpose would constitute a higher beneficial use."
67
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The irrigation law of 1895 was the first to establish a relationship between the quantity of water appropriated and the quantity
of land on which it was to be used, this being one c.f.s. per seventy
acres. But many appropriations had been granted under the 1877
and 1889 acts, 69 some of which exceeded the above maximum.
Today there are still approximately 270 appropriations on file which
were granted prior to 1895.70
In 1939, the State Board of Irrigation attempted to strike down
one of these appropriations on the North Platte River. After
threats by the board to close its headgates, the Enterprise Irrigation District sued to enjoin any action that would prevent it from
diverting all the water that could be put to beneficial use in the
growing of crops.71 The trial court denied an injunction, but the
state supreme court reversed in Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis. 72
The court pointed out that the 1895 statute specifically provided
that it was not to "interfere with or impair the rights to water
appropriated" at an earlier date. Although the district had applied
3.5 acre-feet of water per acre of irrigable land, the court found that
it had all been applied to beneficial use without waste. Noting that
the police power may interfere with vested rights in order to secure
proper regulation and supervision thereof, the court nevertheless
held that "any interference that limits the quantity of water or
changes the date of its priority to the material injury of its holder
is more than regulation and supervision and extends into the field
generally referred to as a deprivation of a vested right."7 3 Thus,
the 1895 limitation mentioned above, and the 1911 limitation of
three acre-feet of water per acre of land, could not be applied retroactively. To do so would constitute a denial of due process.
Obviously these large pre-1895 appropriations are extremely
valuable. The combination of seniority and sizable quantity places
their holders in a most enviable position in a dry year.
Many early western irrigation decrees were for atrociously
large quantities.1 4 Undoubtedly Nebraska has its share of aporopriations that can be so categorized. If so, waste is being perpetuated under the guise of due process. But it should be noted
that the court in Willis did not say that interference with an early
69
70
71
72

73
74

As amended in 1893.
[1961-1962] NEB. DEP'T

oF WATER REsouRcEs BIENNIAL REP. 40.

Up to a maximum of its appropriation, of course, which was 138.9 c.f.s.
135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939).
Id. at 834, 284 N.W. at 330.
Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 301, 305 (1957).
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appropriation would be per se invalid. The court said that such
interference could not materially injure the holder.7 5 Therefore, if
the Department of Water Resources were to investigate these early
permits, and subsequently limit them to the quantity of water actually being used, such a holder would likely find it extremely difficult to prove that he had been "materially injured. '76 A similar
result could be achieved by simply applying the statutory doctrine of beneficial use.7 7 The oil and gas industry has long utilized

regulations requiring the prevention of waste. There is no reason
to believe that this same element of the police power
cannot consti78
tutionally be extended into the law of watercourses.
B.

QUANTITY LnIMATIONS

Economic analysis would indicate that the Nebraska Legislature
erred in establishing maximum quantity limitations for appropriation permits.7 9 One c.f.s. for seventy acres of land is equivalent to
an irrigation well pumping 900 gallons per minute for 140 acres.5 0
Yet in western Nebraska an irrigator would contend that such a
well would only water about 100 acres during a dry year. This
means that the above restriction puts the appropriating irrigator in
an insoluble dilemma. If, with a two c.f.s. appropriation, he plants
140 acres of crops at irrigated seeding rates, he runs the risk of
having only enough water to properly irrigate approximately 100
acres. The remaining forty acres would then yield little, if anything. Alternatively, he might spread the available water over the
full 140 acres, accepting a reduced yield on the entire tract caused
by having insufficient water available at critical times. His final
alternative would be to plant only 100 acres, guaranteeing to himself an adequate water supply. 81 (But if he submits an acreage re-

75

See text accompanying note 69 supra.

76

See Roberts, Panel Discussion on Legislative Problems in the Field of
Riparian & Appropriative Rights, in PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVEsrrY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW 237, 241 (June 10-11, 1954).
See Fisher, Western Experience & Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in
THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 75, 109

77

78

79

80
81

(1958); Trelease, supra note 74, at 305.
See Roberts, supra note 76.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-231 (Reissue 1960).
One c.f.s. is equal to 450 gallons per minute.
The principle of diminishing returns affords a method of estimating
profitability in each of these three alternatives. Nevertheless, the irrigator may be prevented from maximizing profits because of the quan-

tity limitation. It should also be emphasized that if a restriction is to
be applied, it should be in acre-feet, rather than in c.f.s. The latter in-
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port of only 100 acres, he will only be permitted to divert 1.4 c.f.s.)
In eastern Nebraska the statutory maximum may well be ample.
But such is not the case in western Nebraska today, and the limitation will be even more of a hindrance as farmers switch to intensive operations utilizing crops with even greater water requirements. For example, irrigated grass is coming into prominence.
It needs water, not just in July and August (the usual months for
irrigating row crops), but from April to October. For grass to be
efficiently utilized, not only may the one c.f.s. per seventy acre
limitation be undesirable, but the three acre-feet per acre maximum may also be wholly inadequate.
Just how large an appropriation should an individual irrigator
at least a generalized
be granted? Economic theory can provide
82
answer, as is illustrated by Figure I below.

"l

Value of
Corn

line B - Revenue
Cost of

Water

0

Gallons
Quantity of Water

FIGURE 1
Line C indicates that if water costs anything at all, the cost
per acre of corn rises as additional increments of water are added.

82

creases seepage and evaporation losses, and may prevent the application of necessary -quantities at critical times.
See Timmons, Theoretical Considerations of Water Allocation Among
Competing Uses & Users, 38 J. FARm EcoN. 1244, 1249-51 (Dec. 1956),
for a more thorough explanation of this graph and the principles on
which it is developed. For a more general presentation, see LErTwIcn,
THE PRICE SYsTEm & REsOURCE ALLOcATioN 174 (rev. ed. 1961).
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But returns also rise and, so long as line B (the value of the corn
produced on that acre) is above line C the farmer is profiting by
the use of irrigation. At point G, he is applying so much water
per acre that his yield actually begins to decrease. He does not,
however, show a financial loss until point H is reached.
In economic terminology, application of a variable resource
(water) to a given set of fixed resources (the acre of land, a specific
amount of fertilizer, and a given seeding rate) should proceed until
such time as marginal revenue equals marginal cost.8 3 In Figure 1,
this occurs at point D, where the slope of line C is equal to the slope
of line B. This means that at this point the cost of an additional
gallon of water would be equal to the value of the additional corn
produced. Between points D and G yields continue to increase,
but not as rapidly as costs.
The net return per acre is also maximized at D; at no other
point on the graph is the vertical distance between total revenue
(line B) and total cost (line C) as great. If the quantity represented by point D is greater than the statutory maximum, the law
is preventing this farmer from operating efficiently. This illustrates the fallacy and futility of establishing statutory limitations
that at some time, for some use, will unquestionably be outmoded
and detrimental to the public welfare.
It must be conceded that no water administrator has sufficient
research data at hand to determine the location of point D in any
particular case. Water demand depends on the crop to be grown,
soil structure, expected rainfall, humidity, product prices, and a
host of other factors. But this does not mean that he should be
excused from attempting to estimate point D when a permit is
84
granted; the economic concept should not be ignored.
If, however, the legislature is unwilling to depart entirely from
the use of maximums, a step in the proper direction would be to
vary them from west to east as is done in Kansas. 5 Another step
that might be taken would be to reject future applications for the
use of water on poor quality land where marginal productivity will
undoubtedly be low.8 6
83

See

HiRSHLEiFER, DE HAVEN, & MILLIM:AN,
LEFTWIcH, op. cit. supra note 82, at 198.

WATER

SUPPLY

40 (1960);

84 See Fisher, supra note 77, at 109.
85 See Smrha, Problems of Water Law Administration in Kansas, 5 K

.
L. REV. 649, 655 (1957). Kansas at the time of this article used as a
guide two-acre feet per acre in the west, 1 in the central and one in
the east. Though the flexibility is desirable, all these quantities would
appear to be much too low today.
86 See Fisher, supra note 77, at 100.
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C.

WATER SHORTAGES

Many of Nebraska's streams are overappropriated. This means
that it is not at all unusual for junior appropriators to find their
headgates closed during an irrigation season. An irrigator on the
Platte River in the western half of the state has little security unless his priority precedes 1900.7

Yet headgates may be closed on

the crop or at the location where water could be used most effectively at that particular time.88 The determinative factor is seniority, and seniority alone. Some day we may not be able to afford
this luxurious waste. Therefore, it would behoove legislators and
others interested in the problems of water allocation to begin developing and evaluating other devices and mechanisms that might
be used in the allocative process and still protect vested rights.
Despite all the explanations that have been given as to why a
market in water rights will not work,8 9 we may yet discover that
it can be a useful tool. All too often the market is compared with
an administrative agency on an either-or basis, and frequently with
overtones of socialism on the one hand and laissez faire on the
other. Why not evaluate the middle ground, where a market might
possibly function within an administrative framework? 90
A number of writers have advocated prorating water in times
of shortage.9 1 This, of course, has been the foundation of the riparian doctrine of reasonable use. Prorating has an equalitarian
87

In 1961, for example, all canal grants on the Platte River west of
Kearney subsequent to November 24, 1894, were shut off on June 24 and
remained so until September. In July, post-1894 noncanal appropriations were also shut off. [1961-1962] NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES
BImNNIAL REP. 13.

88 See Fisher, supra note 77, at 102.
89 These may be found in many articles written on the subject of administration of water rights. See, e.g., Haber, Protection of Investment, the
Public Interest, and State Water Policy, in THE LAw or WATER ALLOCATIoN in =rE EASTERN UNITED STATES 417, 423 (1958); McPherson, Can
Water Be Allocated by Competitive Prices?, 38 J. FARm EcoN. 1259
(Dec. 1956), discussed by Kristjanson, 39 J. FARm EcoN. 1252 (Dec.
1957). Strong exception to this trend is taken in HmsHL
_R, DE
HAVEN, & MILLnIAN, WATER SUPPLY (1960). An excellent exposition
on this point may be found in Bagley, Some Economic Considerations
in Water Use Policy, 5 KAN. L. REV. 499 (1957).
90 See discussion by Barlowe of the McPherson article, supra note 89, in
38 J. FAmv EcoN. 1280 (Dec. 1956).
91 Texas irrigation companies are required by statute to prorate when
water is limited. "In case of shortage of water from drouth, accident
or other cause, all waters to be distributed shall be divided among all
customers pro rata, according to the amount he or they may be entitled
to, to the end that all shall suffer alike, and preference be given none."
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ring, and a connotation of fairness and justice. 92 Nonetheless, it
will be economically unsound if the concept of marginal productivity is forgotten. Figure 2 illustrates how proration should take
place, not just in times of shortage, but at any time. 93
Farmer B
Quantity of Water

C'

Of

$$
Curve

Value of
Product

Curve

0

Quantity of Water
Farmer A

Value of
Product

C

FIGURE 2
Curve F represents the total revenue of Farmer A, curve G
the total revenue of Farmer B. The latter curve is deliberately
placed upside down on the graph so that the two curves can be
placed tangent to each other. Curve G is noticeably flatter than
curve F. This means that Farmer B is not obtaining as much yield
TEx. REv.

CIV. STAT.

art. 7557 (1954).

See discussion of this statute in

Roberts, Problems Connected with the Distribution of Irrigation Water
in Texas, in PROCEEDINGS, WATER~ LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
SCHOOL OF LAW

79, 93 (Nov. 20-2 1, 1954).

Roberts emphasizes the need

for clarification of this provision because water needs vary according
to soil, maturity status of the crop, etc. This results in some fields
suffering more than others.
92

Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22

93

LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 308 (1957).
See HEADY, ECONOrmCs OF AGRICUL.TURAL. PRODUCTION & RESOURCE USE

118-22 (4th ed. 1961); Timmons, Theoretical Considerations of Water
Allocation Among Competing Uses & Users, 38 J. FARM ECON. 1244,
1254-56 (Dec. 1956).
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response with irrigation as is Farmer A. Water should be allocated between these two irrigators so that their marginal revenues
are equal. This will occur where the slope of the two curves is
equal-at the point of tangency. Of the total quantity of water
allocated to these two farmers, Farmer A should receive OC, and
Farmer B, OC'. The latter quantity is smaller because of the lesser
yield response. This principle should be applied if Nebraska ever
uses a pro rata system of water distribution. 4
Rotating might also be used in time of shortage. 95 This would
ordinarily be on a voluntary basis with some farmers using double
their grants one week and nothing the following week, while
others would operate on just the opposite schedule. Such rotations would reduce seepage and evaporation losses in transmission,
and would quite likely reduce farm labor requirements. The rotation principle could also be used by having some farmers irrigate
in the spring and fall, while others would irrigate only in the

summer.
A rotation system is the antithesis of pro rata distribution, and
thus much more efficient. It must be recognized, however, that
the cost of administration may sometimes override the benefits.9 6

This has also been described as the concept of "equimarginal value in
use." See the comprehensive coverage of this point in HIsHLEIFEE, DE
HAVEN & MILLInAN, WATER SUPPLY 37 (1960).
95 Fisher, supranote 77, at 110. See ProposedSurface Water Law for Michigan § 25, in THE LAw OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED
94

STATES 49, 60 (1958): "The users of water . . .may rotate in the exercise of their rights . . .to which they are collectively entitled, so long
as the rights of others are not injuriously affected; provided that the
schedule of rotation shall be approved in advance by the Commission."
Model Water Use Act § 501, in UNIVERSrry OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES & THE LAw 581 (1958), grants the water
administrator the right to rotate uses in times of shortage, but domestic
uses and preserved riparian uses must be preferred.
96 By statute, Texas permits seasonal permits and temporary permits of
not more than three months duration. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 7467 (c)
(1954).
The seasonal permits have not been adequately supervised
because of limited funds and personnel. It is assumed that many of
these permit holders continue to divert after their permits run out.

Rollins, Policies of the Board of Water Engineers in Passing Upon Ap-

plications for Appropriative Rights, in PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAw CONFERENCE, UNIvERsITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAw

221, 223 (June 10-11,

1954); Hutchins, Western Water Rights Doctrines & Their Development
inKansas, 5 KAN. L. REv. 533, 566 (1957).
Both seasonal and temporary permits are deserving of consideration in Nebraska.
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TRANSFERABILITY OF APPROPRIATION RIGHTS

With most streams overappropriated, the only way that a potential water user in Nebraska can obtain a secure water right is to
purchase land bearing an appropriation of early priority. The
water right itself cannot be transferred because of an unwise statutory prohibition that may discourage water-using industries from
entering the state.97 All the locational advantages of a particular
area or city are meaningless if water rights are unavailable.
But aside from the issue of economic development, such a prohibition negates the possibility of shifting water from one irrigator
to another or from an irrigator to a power plant or manufacturing
98
company, even though such shifts might be economically justified.
This is a most serious shortcoming in Nebraska law. Professor
Ciriacy-Wantrup has noted that appropriation law made many mistakes in its initial allocation of water supplies. Marginal concepts
were ignored and water is not nearly as productive as it should be.
But he adds that this is no great tragedy so long as water can move
from one user to another, one use to another, and one region to
another. The drawback of seniority loses its economic significance
if statutes afford flexibility. 99
Nebraska does not now have such flexibility. It should, therefore, remove its restrictions on transferability except where detrimental to the public interest'0 0 or violative of vested rights.'0 '
(Reissue 1960), which requires that applications for irrigation permits must describe the land to be irrigated and
the amount thereof. Contrast this with the proposed Michigan statute
which provides that water rights may be separately conveyed, and that
irrigation permits are applicable to a gross area not more than five
times the estimated maximum acreage irrigable in one year with the
quantity authorized. Purpose of use and location of gross area may be
changed by permit after hearing. See Proposed Surface Water Law for
Michigan, in THE LAw OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES 49, 58-60 (1958).

97 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-233

98 Although § 46-233 makes no references to land descriptions other than

for irrigation, neither does it provide a mechanism whereby transfers

involving power, industry, or other uses could take place. Since the
appropriation statutes are intended to be comprehensive, it is doubtful
that the court would imply the power to establish such a mechanism
within the general authority given the Department of Water Resources.
99 See discussion by Professor Ciriacy-Wantrup in THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 557 (1958).
100 See Trelease, supranote 92, at 315; Trelease, Trends in the Law of Prior
Appropriation,in PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
TExAs SCHOOL OF LAW 206, 216 (June 10-11, 1954); Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133, 138-40 (1955) (discussing reservations for future city growth and for preferred uses).
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E. FomErruE OF APPROPRIATION RIGHTs
If an appropriation has not been used for beneficial purposes, or

having once been so used, has not been used for such purpose for
more than three years, the Department of Water Resources may,
after a show cause hearing, declare such appropriation102forfeited.
This decision may be appealed to the state supreme court.
By virtue of the above statute, one would assume that there are
now two ways in which an appropriation right may be lost: (1)
03
by abandonment, or intentional relinquishment of such right;
and (2) by statutory forfeiture for nonuse regardless of intent.
After some confusion created by an earlier case, 0 4 the Nebraska
Supreme Court recognized the two methods listed above and added
still a third, nonuse of water rights for the ten year period of statutory limitations relating to real estate. 10 5

As the statute is presently worded, nonuse for a three year
period might necessitate forfeiture even though accounted for by
high rainfall or loss to senior appropriators because of a water
101 See discussion of the problems of return flow in section F infra.
102 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-229 to -229.05 (Reissue 1960). The constitutionali-

ty of this provision was upheld in Kersenbrock v. Boyes, 95 Neb. 407,
145 N.W. 837 (1914), and in Dawson County Irr. Co. v. McMullen, 120

Neb. 245, 231 N.W. 840 (1930).
103 State v. Birdwood Irr. Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 56 N.W.2d 884 (1951), held
that the department could, if it so desired, cancel only part of an appropriation, rather than all of it. See Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska,
29 NEB. L. REV. 385, 409 (1950).
104 In State v. Oliver Bros., 119 Neb. 302, 304-05, 228 N.W. 864, 865 (1930),
plaintiff sought to secure the cancellation of defendants' water rights
on grounds of nonuse for the three year statutory period. The complaint was dismissed by the department, with subsequent affirmation
by the state supreme court. In support of its holdings, the court cited
an Idaho case defining abandonment as "the relinquishment of a right
by the owner thereof, without any regard to future possession by himself or any other person, but with the intention to forsake or desert the
right," and an Arizona case stating that abandonment is "a matter of
intent as such intent may be evidenced by the declaration of the party
or as may be fairly inferred from his acts." (Emphasis added.) That
such confusion might result from the wording of the Nebraska statutes
is suggested by Fisher, supra note 77, at 119.
105 State v. Nielsen, 163 Neb. 372, 381, 79 N.W.2d 721, 728 (1956): "The
procedure referred to in sections 46-229 to 46-229.05 . . . is not exclusive. The courts of this state have recognized two methods of loss of
irrigation rights independent of statutory procedure for concellation by
the department of such rights. These two methods may be classified
as abandonment of water rights, or nonuser of such rights for the period
of statutory limitations relating to real estate." Section 25-202 is
cited on the latter point.
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shortage. Undoubtedly the Department of Water Resources would
take such factors into consideration in its decision after a show
cause hearing, 10 6 but a clarifying statutory amendment is also in
07
order.
Nebraska has a unique statute providing that the Department
of Water Resources shall examine the condition of irrigation ditches
in the state, and the condition of its appropriations. If, after such
examination, a forfeiture proceeding seems justified, the department serves notice of the show cause hearing.'0 8 In contrast, the
burden of initiating forfeiture proceedings in most states is on other
water users. 0 9 Logically, the Nebraska procedure is much superior
and has been commended as such," 0 but has not proven to be so in
106 Forfeiture statutes are not generally applied when the nonuse is involuntary and not attributable to the neglect of the appropriator. See
107

Trelease, supra note 92, at 316.
See Proposed Surface Water Law for Michigan § 23(b), in THE
OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

LAW

49, 59 (1958),

which reads as follows:
"The abandonment of any such water rights shall be evidenced as
follows:
(1) Intent to abandon the use of water, whether expressly de-

dared or reasonably implied from the acts of the user, accompanied by actual cessation of the use of the water; or
(2) A continuous failure, for a period of five years, to effect a
beneficial use of the water, in which event the intent to

abandon to the extent of such failure shall be conclusively
presumed; provided no intention to abandon shall be presumed either where the available water supply is inadequate
to enable the holder of the right to exercise the beneficial
use of water contemplated thereunder, or, in the case of
irrigation, where due to climatic conditions irrigation is unnecessary during the period of continuous failure to effect
use of the water."
See also Model Water Use Act § 306, in UNIVERSITY OF ICHIGAN
& THE LAW 570 (1958).
46-229.01 to -.02 (Reissue 1960).
109 See Trelease, Trends in the Law of Prior Appropriation, in
LAW SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES

108 NEB. REV. STAT. §§

PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW

206, 215 (June 10-11, 1954).
110 See Fisher, Western Experience & Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in
THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

(1958).

Trelease, supra note 109, at 215-16, states:

75, 121

"The courts have

in some states been understandably reluctant to declare that a person
has lost his rights and have gone beyond simply protecting the appropriator and have placed restrictions upon abandonment procedures that
make them almost impossible of enforcement. Wyoming's court has
held that these proceedings can be initiated only by a water user who
can clearly show that he will be directly benefited by the water, a
condition extremely hard to prove on a fluctuating stream .... With
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practice. With thousands of appropriations to supervise, the department simply has not had the time, funds, nor personnel to gather evidence and conduct the hearings necessary to bring its permits up to date. Many smaller streams are unsupervised, the department assuming that so long as no complaints are heard everyone is receiving enough water. Presumably, the department does
not object to irrigators withdrawing quantities in excess of their
appropriations so long as no other appropriator is thereby injured.
This is practical- administration and sound economics, since otherwise the surplus flow would forever be lost to the state.
The department is fully cognizant of the fact that there are
many appropriations in the state that have not been used for more
than three years. Yet, in the absence of additional funds, it is
powerless to remedy the situation."' Nebraska is not alone in
this problem. In Texas, for example, it has been found that appropriation permits total four times the amount of water in actual
112
use.

Unfortunately, this dilemma carries over into other aspects of
water administration. With unused appropriation rights scattered
throughout the state, the department cannot possibly perform its
administrative functions with maximum effectiveness." 3 Streams
that statistically appear to be overappropriated may in actuality be
underappropriated. For this reason the department policy is to
water as scarce as it is, no state can today afford to permit appropriators to take a dog in the manger attitude and reserve water although
they never use it."
111 An official report to the Oregon Legislature recommended that the cost
of surveys such as those contemplated in Nebraska be reduced by requiring each applicant to file an annual statement of the amount of
water beneficially used, with loss of the right on failure so to file. See
Fisher, supra note 110, at 121. See also text accompanying note 118
infra.
Texas does require reports with penalties of up to $150 for failure
to submit such reports. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 7611-7612(a) (1948).
112 See Trelease, supra note 92, at 313. Trelease notes that in Oregon
certificates had been issued covering twice the acreage actually irrigated, and he adds that ineffective abandonment and forfeiture procedures
are responsible for this condition.
113 Dean Trelease points out that such "stale claims" have created considerable uncertainty both for existing appropriators and would-be new
users needing to know the amount of water covered by valid rights
senior to theirs. Ibid.
For a discussion of the Texas situation, see Rollins, The Need for
a Water Inventory in Texas, in PROCEEDaINS, WATER LAw CONFERENCE,
UNivERsiTy OF TEXAs SCHOOL or LAw 67, 68 (Nov. 20-21, 1954); Com-

ment, Stale Claims in Texas Stream Waters, 28 TExAs L. REV. 931
(1950).
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approve all applications for permits."

4

Although the applicant

knows he is a junior appropriator, he has no way of determining
just how "junior" he really is. The department can tell him the
quantity of appropriations senior to his, but cannot tell him how
much of that quantity will likely be used each year. In such a
situation the applicant takes a tremendous investment risk; and
security, which supposedly is the bulwark of the appropriation
doctrine, is a myth." 5
At least two ameliorating steps would seem appropriate. First,
the Department of Water Resources can be adequately financed so
that this phase of its duties can be properly handled.11 6 Second,
the forfeiture procedure can be simplified so that it is less expensive and time consuming.
Due process requires that a hearing be part of a foreclosure
proceeding. But statutes can be drafted so as to discourage its
use by permit holders with impossibly weak cases. A suggested
procedure might operate as follows. The April 1 acreage report" 7
would not only require a listing of all acres to be irrigated during the coming season, but also all acres irrigated during the
past year."" Negative reports would not be required. Should any
See Fisher, supra note 110, at 144 n.262.
115 See Trelease, supra note 109, at 216: "One really limiting factor on new
enterprise and growth is the reluctance of the person launching a new
enterprise to take his place on the bottom of the priority list. This is
especially true of the persons contemplating the founding of a new
industry which needs a firm water supply, but it is no less true of a
person contemplating the entrance into a new agricultural enterprise
or the irrigator who desires to put the water presently used on poor
114

lands onto more productive land. These new enterprises need and
should be given the opportunity to buy, at the going rate, a firm water
right of a sufficiently early priority to insure the stability of the enterprise."
116 The department is hampered not only by limited total financial resources, but also by a pay scale that is inadequate to attract engineering graduates. Statutes that have been passed should be carried out
and compliance therewith should be secured. Contrast the discussion
in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 374,
375 (1958), where Mississippi Water Commissioner Nelson asserted on
the subject of having many people irrigating without permits, "I think
what we try to do in Mississippi is to bring the law into accordance
with what is actually going on in the State rather than to try to force
people to conform to the law."
117 See discussion at section IV(D) supra.
11s See note 11 supra. The department could spot check the veracity of
these statements from sources such as county ASCS offices. A provision for penalty in the event fraud can be shown might be included in
the statute.
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appropriator not submit a report for three consecutive years, the
department would have authority to temporarily cancel the entire
appropriation; should a reduced acreage be reported for three consecutive years, the department could temporarily reduce the appropriation. Such action could not, however, be taken if it appeared that nonuse was due to either a water shortage or high
rainfall. The shortage question would be determined from the department's own records on the closing of headgates; the rainfall
question from Weather Bureau data.
The appropriator would be given written notice of the temporary cancellation. He would then have thirty days in which to file
a written request for a hearing before the Department of Water
Resources. The department would have no authority to deny such
a request. All costs, however, would be borne by the permit holder
if the appropriation were not reinstated either by the department
or by the state supreme court on appeal. At the hearing, the permit holder would bear the burden of showing that the temporary
cancellation should be withdrawn. If no hearing were requested, or
if he were unsuccessful at such hearing, the cancellation would be
made permanent. 1 9

F. DowNsTEAM SENIOR v. UPSTREAM JUNIOR APPROPRIATORS
One of the most patent examples of legalized water waste is
that involved in upstream junior-downstream senior appropriator
conflicts. It is also an administrator's nightmare, particularly in
Nebraska because of its many appropriations spread across the state.
The Department of Water Resources considers all streams in the
Platte River basin between the Wyoming and Colorado borders and
Kearney to be overappropriated. 20 Thus, a number of permit
holders must be shut off during the dry summer months in nearly
every year. But should the headgate of a junior appropriator at
North Platte be closed if his grant would entirely evaporate before
reaching the senior appropriator at Kearney? Of course not, and
the Nebraska Supreme Court would so hold.'-' But what if two119 In addition to the procedure just discussed, the legislature could appro120

121

priately authorize a voluntary relinquishment procedure without
hearing.
See [1961-1962] NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES BIENNIAL REP. 13.
State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 173, 292 N.W. 239, 246
(1940): "If it appear that all the available water in the stream would
be lost before its arrival at the headgate of the ...

[downstream]

canal, it would, of course, be an unjustified waste of water to attempt
delivery."
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thirds of it would actually reach Kearney? The average person
would probably say that in such a case the junior appropriator
should be shut off. This leaves an intermediate area in which
much discretion must necessarily be placed in the state's water
commissioners. Their decisions, based on the best hydrologic, geologic, and meteorologic data available, may still often be wrong because of uncontrollable factors such as unlawful diversions,
ab122
normal weather, or delayed compliance with closing orders.
In 1940, several irrigators and a power company in Buffalo
County sought to compel state administrative officials to stop alleged unlawful diversions by junior upstream appropriators on the
Platte River. Plaintiffs had grants totalling 162 c.f.s. which dated
back to 1882. But the state supreme court, in State ex rel. Cary v.
Cochran,123 held the upstream diversions to be lawful. The court
noted that losses from evaporation and transpiration in the Platte
River are heavy because of its width, the hot summer weather,
wind, and a low velocity of only twenty-five miles per day. In addition, east of North Platte percolation losses become severe, with
from 50,000 to 100,000 acre-feet of water seeping into the Republican River basin each year. Streamflow is also reduced by pump
irrigation in the Platte Valley, especially in Dawson County. Expert
testimony indicated that it would take 700 c.f.s. of flow at North
Platte to deliver 162 c.f.s. to the plaintiffs at Kearney. In resolving
the dispute, the court held that junior appropriators must be restrained from taking water from the river so long as such water can
be delivered in usable quantities at the headgate of the Kearney
canal. 124 A "usable" quantity, said the court, is a question of fact
for the administrators. So long as their decision is not arbitrary or
unreasonable, it will not be overturned by the judiciary.125
It has been suggested that downstream appropriators be protected only when the amount that will reach them is reasonable
(not just usable) in relation to the amount that a junior upstream
appropriator must allow to flow past.1 26 This is an effort to insure
that economic considerations are interjected into the dispute so

122
123
124
125

126

In Robinson v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 142 Neb. 811, 8 N.W.2d 179
(1943), the court again held in favor of the upstream appropriator upon
testimony that it would take 1,000 c.f.s. to get water to the downstream
appropriator, whereas there was only 100 c.f.s. in the river at the time.
See State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, supra note 121, at 172, 292 N.W. at
245.
138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940).
Id. at 173, 292 N.W. at 246.
Ibid.
Fisher, supra note 110, at 113.
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that waste is circumvented to the greatest extent possible. Although it is apparent that the Nebraska court's definition of a
"usable" quantity may differ little from what is "reasonable," the
court did specifically reject the latter doctrine in the Cary case.
In explanation of this holding, the court said that to permit administrators to say whether prospective losses would or would not
justify the delivery of usable quantities would be to clothe them
with a discretion incompatible
with the vested interests of the
1 27
downstream appropriators.
Dean Trelease suggests another approach to the problem:
The solution .

.

. may be economic, in that if the benefits that

would accrue from upstream use are, in fact, much greater than

those realized by the senior appropriator, it would seem feasible for
the upstream user
to buy out the lower prior rights and transfer the
use upstream.128

In Nebraska, the Trelease remedy to this wasteful situation is
presently out of the question because of the statutory prohibition
of changes in place of use. But even if this obstacle can be
hurdled by legislation, one is faced with the additional task of protecting the vested rights of permit holders located between the old
and new places of use. This is a major stumbling block because
changes may be made in place of use, point of diversion, or purpose
of use, all of which may affect the amount of return flow available
to downstream irrigators.129 Permits to transfer water rights are
thus usually made subject to the restriction that no damage to the
127

State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 133 Neb. 163, 175, 292 N.W. 239, 247
(1940). But cf. Kearney Water & Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irr.Dist.,
97 Neb. 139, 143, 149 N.W. 363, 367 (1914).

128

Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22
LAw & CoNTEvu'. PROB. 301, 306 (1957).

129

See Fisher, supra note 110, at 99 n.65: "A change in the point of diversion, whether the move is up or down the stream, will affect other users
between the old and new points by altering the velocity, quantity, and
level of the flow reaching them. A change in the place of use (or the
location of conveyance ditches) may mean that seepage water and water flowing from the surface of the field where used will take a different course back toward the stream, perhaps cutting the supply of
persons who had used the water along its previous route and perhaps
water-logging land along its new route. Because the nature of the soil
at the new place of use or along the new return route may be different,
the unconsumed water may re-enter the stream at a different time or
with a greater content of dissolved solids to the injury of downstream
users. A change in the purpose of use may be reflected in all these
factors of timing, velocity, quantity, level, and purity of flow, and such
a change may be especially disruptive of established conditions if the
new purpose is a more consumptive use than the former one."
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rights of other appropriators may result.
If the new upstream use is nonconsumptive, return flow will
be unaffected. Power and many industrial uses fall into this category, or at least closely approximate it. Irrigation, on the other
hand, is consumptive in nature and reduces return flow by more
than half the quantity diverted.' 3 ' How then can such a transfer
of inbe accomplished without violating the constitutional rights
32
jured third parties? Among the possibilities are these:
(1) Apply a "balancing the equities" doctrine. 33 This would
mean usually, but not always, denying these third parties the134injunction remedy and relegating them to actions for damages.
130

Gaffney, Water Law & Economic Transfers of Water: A Reply, 44 J.
"[A]ppropriative law does not pro-

FARM ECON. 427, 431 (May 1962):

vide that injured parties shall be compensated when diversion points
are moved; rather, it provides that parties shall not be injured. The
injured party has not just a damage claim, but a veto worth what the
traffic will bear. This puts the water-buyer in the position of a rightof-way agent unarmed with eminent domain." See generally Trelease,
supra note 128, at 314; Trelease, Trends in the Law of PriorAppropriation, in PROCEEDINGS, WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
131

SCHOOL OF LAW 206, 216 (June 10-11, 1954).
In HIRSHLEIFER, DE HAVEN, & MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY

182 (1960), the

authors estimate that surface irrigation is consumptive of 70-90%
of the applied water. They add that it is not unusual for less than

60% of the quantity diverted to be applied at the farm. The remaining
40% constitutes seepage, which is usable by downstream appropriators,
and evapotranspiration, which is not. Duprey cites a Senate committee report estimating consumptive use as follows: Irrigation - 59%;
Municipal - 13%; Manufacturing - 9%; Mining - 20%; and Steam Electric Power Cooling - 1%. Duprey, Water Problems-Nationaland Re132

133

134

gional, 38 N.D.L. REV. 233, 235 (1962).
See Busby, American Water Rights Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106, 162 (1952);
Ellis, Some Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina,in THE LAW
OF WATER ALLOCATION IN TH EASTERN UNITED STATES 189, 397 (1958).
I have suggested that such a rationale might also be applied in diffused
surface water conflicts. See Comment, Diffused Surface Water Law in
Nebraska, 41 NEB. L. REV. 765 (1962).
See Trelease, Water Law & Economic Transfers of Waters: A Rejoinder,
44 J. FAmv ECON. 435, 440 (May 1962). He would not apply this doc-

trine unless benefits of the change would be overwhelming in comparison to the disadvantages of not permitting such change, emphasizing
that we should be hesitant to go further than this in giving private
individuals the right of eminent domain over another's property. His
suggested statutory wording is as follows: "A change may be granted
in part or subjected to conditions including the payment of damages to
an injured person in order to avoid injury to private property or to the
public interest."
Arens, Michigan Law of Water Allocation, in THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION IN

THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

377, 397 (1958) states: "An
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(2) Approve the change only on condition that the new user
pay such third party damages13 5as have been calculated by the Department of Water Resources.
(3) Approve the change unconditionally where a de minimis
theory 136 would be appropriate. As no damages would be recoverable, this3 7 might necessitate reducing the quantity approved for
transfer.
(4) Approve the change unconditionally, recognizing that
damages will be suffered by third parties, but assuming that such
parties will be compensated by reduced taxes. 38
For the protection of the public interest, all such transfers
should be made subject to the approval of the Department of Water
Resources, with appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Within
this framework, however, a market might be permitted to func139
tion.

injunction seems unbelievable . . .where ... [it] would result in a
relatively small gain to the plaintiff compared to the loss to the defendant or the loss to the community's economy, and where the defendant could get compensation by way of damages."
The Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to balance equities in an
early decision, Barton v. Union Cattle Co., 28 Neb. 350, 44 N.W. 454
(1889). Though injury to the complainant apparently was trifling the
court said this was immaterial and, furthermore, an injunction would be
granted without regard to the magnitude of the interest enjoined.
185 The burden of providing evidence for such calculation, and the burden
of supporting such proof before the state supreme court on appeal,
could be placed upon the applicant, the department, or the injured
parties. This choice should be legislatively delineated.
136 The law does not recognize trifles.
1s7 This would be an impractical solution if a sizable appropriation were
essential to the operation of the new use.
138 Gaffney, supra note 130, at 431-32: "It would be hard to find a public
or private decision or transaction without effects on others than the
principal parties. In fields other than water, the law wisely refrains
from requiring the active parties to come to terms with all the discommoded passive ones, else transactions would cease and society
would stagnate. A commodity is not merchantable if not cut clean
from the cloying entourage of indirect interests.
"It would still be desirable to devise means to compensate losers
from the gains of winners. It is monstrously impractical to do so in
each individual transaction. A workable alternative lies in the tax
mechanism. Many indirect gains and losses accrue to individuals in
their capacity as landholders. Let the fise therefore rely heavily on
ad valorem land taxes, keep assessments punctiliously current, and the
winners automatically compensate the losers. Progress in this direction
would seem to hold forth greater promise than litigating ad infinitum
the external costs and gains of every transaction."
139 The return flow issue with its accompanying effects on third parties
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G.

PREFERENCES

(1)

The Legal Implications
Nebraska statute, section 46-204, provides:
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purposes, but when the waters
of any natural stream are not sufficient for the use of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming it for any other
purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall
have the 140
preference over those using the same for manufacturing
purposes.

140

is one of the most confused in all of water law. Little progress will be
made on the question until legal and economic authors begin to understand it.
For example, Seastone & Hartman, in Alternative Institutions for
Water Transfers: The Experience in Colorado & New Mexico, 39 LAND
ECON. 31, 34 (1963), assert that the Colorado courts employ consumptive
use as the essential determinant of water transfers. Consumptive
use has two dimensions: (1) beneficial use, and (2) return flow. If
only ten c.f.s. of a twenty c.f.s. appropriation has been used in the past,
the court will permit a transfer only of that amount. The other ten
c.f.s. will be declared abandoned. There can be no legal-economic
objections to this. But then, of the ten c.f.s. that have been used in the
past, the court permits the transfer of only the portion that has been
consumed. If, e.g., 60% has been consumed, six c.f.s. would be transferred. The authors say that this assures no change in return flow so
that downstream users are protected. This is only partially correct.
Assume that the original diversion is at point A, and the new diversion
is upstream at point B. The downstream users below A are protected;
they will receive four c.f.s. of return flow as before since this quantity
was not transferred. They will even better their previous position if
the six c.f.s. that is transferred upstream is not completely consumed.
But the users between A and B are not protected. All ten c.f.s. had
been flowing by their land in the past; now six c.f.s. will be diverted at
point B, lessening the flow past their land unless all six c.f.s. come back
as return flow. In other words, a transfer upstream will damage all
users between the old downstream location and the new upstream location unless the new use upstream is totally nonconsumptive.
If, on the other hand, the new use is downstream, the users between the old and new points of diversion will benefit. They formerly
had four c.f.s. of return flow; now all ten c.f.s. will move past their
land. If six c.f.s. is transferred, as the court apparently would do,
those downstream from the new diversion point will not be damaged
either. They will still get four c.f.s. of the flow that is not transferred,
the same as they received in return flow before the transfer, and will
gain if the new use is not completely consumptive. If the new use is
less consumptive than the old, more than six c.f.s. could be transferred.
The court needs only to insure that four c.f.s. return to the stream.
Thus, if the new use is nonconsumptive, there is no reason why all
ten c.f.s. should not be transferred.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-204 (Reissue 1960).
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Another provision, section 70-668, is copied almost verbatim

from the above paragraph, except that a preference for agricultural
over power purposes, where turbine or water wheels are installed,
41

is added.
Since the above statutes permit certain junior appropriators
to temporarily deprive senior appropriators of their water rights,
compensation must be required. To provide otherwise would be
an unconstitutional deprivation of vested rights. As a consequence,
section 70-669 asserts that no inferior right to the use of water shall
142
be acquired by a superior right without just compensation.
Compensation paid to those using water for power purposes cannot
be greater than the cost of replacing that power from another
source. This is the well known economic doctrine of opportunity
cost, aptly applied.
The statutes go on to elucidate specific procedures whereby irrigation districts may condemn water being used for power purposes. If the condemnor and condemnee are unable to agree on
the amount of compensation to be paid, the property will be condemned by court action under sections 76-704 to 76-724. Public
power and irrigation districts are also given the power of eminent
domain to acquire property owned and used in the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electrical energy. But the statutes
do not provide a procedure whereby an individual holder of a
junior domestic appropriation may condemn a senior irrigation or
power appropriation, or whereby an individual holder of a junior
irrigation appropriation may condemn a senior power appropriation.
Presumably, such a right could be implied; otherwise the preferences given such individuals in sections 70-668 and 46-204 are
worthless. 143 Nevertheless, some would contend that condemnation by individuals is doomed on constitutional grounds. 4 4 This
question merits further analysis.
In Crawford Co. v. Hathaway,the following comment on preferences is made:
141

142

143

144

NEB. REv.

STAT. § 70-668 (Reissue 1958).
It was noted in section III
supra,that the appropriation doctrine enacted in 1895 could not be used
to destroy vested riparian rights. The same rationale applies to the
preference statutes, also first enacted in 1895. They can have no effect
on riparian or appropriation rights in existence at that time. See
Kearney Water & Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irr. Dist., 97 Neb. 779, 151
N.W. 819 (1915), modifying 97 Neb. 139, 149 N.W. 363 (1914).
NEs. REV. STAT. § 70-669 (Reissue 1958).
See Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 Rocx MT. L. REV.
133, 151 n.138 (1955).
Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv. 385, 409 (1950).
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What the legislature has done with a view of promoting irrigation
...is to provide for the appropriation of ... the streams of the
state and to authorize the condemnation of ...waters belonging to
riparian proprietors .... 145

The right of an individual to use the powers of eminent domain
could easily be implied from the above statement. It is all-inclusive
in nature, with no apparent limitations or qualifications. Furthermore, the plaintiff was a private irrigation company.
But then Vetter v. Broadhurst146 cast a dark shadow over the
above interpretation. In Vetter, a farmer obtained a permit to construct and maintain a storage reservoir for irrigation purposes, in
accordance with the provisions of what is now section 46-241 of the
Nebraska statutes. Section 46-241 refers to "every person," which
certainly could be construed to include private individuals; and it
gives the "applicant" the right to condemn land for use as a storage
reservoir. On this basis the defendant sought to condemn several
acres of the plaintiff's farm which would be inundated by the stored
water. The court, however, held that condemnation must be for a
public use and that the proposed storage would not so qualify.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court had held in
Clark v. Nash 147 that in Utah irrigation was a public use, and that
a similar condemnation was constitutional. 48 The Court did say
that its decision was based on the unique soil and climatic conditions of Utah, and that it was not approving the broad proposition
that private property may be taken in all cases where the taking
may promote the public interest and tend to develop the natural
resources of the state. 49 The Nebraska court used this qualification in distinguishing Clark v. Nash, and further supported its
holding by means of stare decisis. 50 The court went on to take
judicial notice of the fact that "neither climatic, agricultural, industrial or social conditions in this state indicate that any such advantage will accrue by permitting such a taking as this statute authorizes."' ll
93 N.W. 781, 786 (1903).
N.W. 109 (1916).
147 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
148 For other authorities in support of this point see THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 82, 125 (1958).
149 Id. at 369-70.
150 Earlier Nebraska cases had held that public use, in a constitutional
sense, must be common, and must not refer to a particular individual.
See Vetter v. Broadhurst, 100 Neb. 356, 361-62, 160 N.W. 109, 111 (1916).
151 Id. at 363, 160 N.W. at 112.
145 67 Neb. 325, 342,
146 100 Neb. 356, 160
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The above decision means that an irrigation district can condemn senior power appropriations, but an individual irrigator cannot. The court, however, reconciled this apparent anomaly by distinguishing the irrigation district as being, in essence, a common
carrier of water, and thus formed for a public purpose.
Irrigators in Nebraska do purchase power appropriations. This
152
Comhas been done in the Loup River basin for many years.
pensation is determined by contractual agreement between the irrigators and the power company. But what if agreement cannot
be reached? And what if the power company refuses to relinquish
its appropriation rights for any price? In such a situation the irrigators would have no alternative but to attempt condemnation
through court proceedings. If and when this occurs, the court will
have to determine the applicability of the Vetter case to Nebraska's
preference statutes.
The dicta of two decisions arising from the Loup basin may
signal an eventual overruling of the Vetter rationale. In the first,
Loup River Pub. Power Dist. v. North Loup River Pub. Power
& Irr. Dist.,'1 53 the plaintiff power company was successful in preventing the defendant irrigation district from making upstream
diversions in excess of its appropriation rights. But in discussing
preferences, the court said:
Section 6 of Article XV of the Constitution, fixing a priority of
uses for which public waters may be appropriated, is a self-executing provision and the courts, in the absence of a statutory method,
would be obliged to provide the means for enforcing its provisions. 154
The Vetter case is not even mentioned in this opinion, which
contains none of the earlier limitations and qualifications. The
above statement would seem to clearly and definitively support
the right of individual eminent domain under the preference statutes.
Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist.,155 a 1962 case, went
even further. Hickman, an irrigator, attempted to secure cancellation of the power district's appropriation. By way of compromise,
the district agreed to permit him to perpetually interfere with their
senior appropriation to the extent of his 1.28 c.f.s. irrigation permit.
152 See Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 432, 113

N.W.2d 617, 620 (1962).
142 Neb. 141, 5 N.W.2d 240 (1942).
154 Id. at 153, 5 N.W.2d at 248.
155 173 Neb. 428, 113 N.W.2d 617 (1962).
153
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Hickman refused the offer and the Department of Water Resources
dismissed his cancellation proceeding.
The court reversed, holding that the effect of the dismissal was
to force Hickman to accept the power district's offer against his
will.156 In further amplifying the meaning of the preference statute, the court said:
[W]here the owner of a superior right seeks to acquire water being
used for power purposes, and compensation to be paid cannot be
agreed upon, the procedure to condemn property shall be exercised
in the manner set forth in sections 76-704 to 76-724 ....
We point
out that Hickman has not attempted to condemn any of the waters
appropriated by Loup District. Neither has he agreed with Loup
District on 5the
amount of compensation to be paid in lieu of con7
demnation.1
It will indeed be a short step for the court to move from its

Hickman dicta to a specific holding authorizing condemnation of
water rights by private individuals. But how can this be reconciled with constitutional provisions that private property shall
only be taken for public needs? The Colorado court did so in the
following manner: 5a
Although the words "private use" occur in our constitution and
statutes, it is obvious that they do not mean a strictly private use;
that is to say, one having no relation to the public interest. The
fact that the constitution permits private property to be taken for
certain specified uses is an implied declaration that such uses are
so closely connected with the public interest as to be at least quasi
public, or, in a modified sense, affected with a public interest .... 159

Scarcity of water will eventually force the Nebraska court to
move in the same direction. After all, the Colorado opinion is but
a mirror of Clark v. Nash.16 0 In Vetter, the Nebraska Supreme
156

Id. at 437, 113 N.W.2d at 623.

157

Ibid.

158 See Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc Co., 90 Colo. 529, 537, 11

P.2d 221, 224-25 (1932), discussed in Thomas, Appropriations of Water
for a PreferredPurpose, 22 RocKY MT. L. REV. 422, 429 (1950).
159 See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7: "All persons and corporations shall
have the right of way across public, private and corporate lands for the
construction of ditches, canals and flumes for the purpose of conveying
water for domestic purposes, for the irrigation of agricultural lands,
and for mining and manufacturing purposes, and for drainage, upon
payment of just compensation."
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14 provides: "Private property shall not
be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for
private ways of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or
ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes."
160 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
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Court did not feel that the state had yet reached the point where
storage of water by an individual was so essential to the public
welfare that another person's land could be taken for that purpose. 161 Presumably Utah has reached that point. 6 2 Continued
arid conditions coupled with the inexorable population increase
will inevitably demand that Vetter be distinguished or overruled.
(2)

The Economic Implications

Nebraska's water preferences are not only established by statute, but are also included in the state constitution. 10 3 The wisdom of this is open to serious doubt. As one writer has said, the
order of preference in most states reflects economic conditions of a
bygone era. 64 Nebraska is no exception.
Domestic uses should always be accorded first priority; 16 5 no
one would debate this point. This is an issue, not of economics, but
of human survival. Irrigation, power, manufacturing, and other
uses are an entirely different matter. Their respective priorities
have been determined on political grounds, when they should have
been determined on economic grounds. Furthermore, even from
an economic standpoint, generalization into broad categories cannot
be justified. The key determinant should be marginal value productivity, and this will vary with type of use, scale of use, and many
other factors. In some locations power may have a higher marginal
161 Vetter was followed in Onstott v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 129 Neb.
54, 260 N.W. 556 (1935). The court then admitted that both New
Mexico and Utah were contra.
162 This would seem to be the tenor of Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
163 NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.

See also NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, §§ 5, 7 for

other constitutional provisions relating to water.
164 Fisher, Western Experience & Eastern AppropriationProposals,in THE
LAw or WATER ALLOCATION IN TH EASTERN UNTED STATES 75, 126
(1958).
Trelease comments on this point as follows: "[P]references may
insure the economic growth of certain types of water use deemed desirable when the statutes were enacted, but admittedly, most of today's
preferences embody the economic thinking of yesterday. To the extent
that a legislature, perhaps under the guidance of a planning agency,
can foresee that a certain purpose is now and will be tomorrow more
desirable than another use, such preferences are valid, but they should
be periodically reviewed in order to keep abreast of modern thinking."
Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 315 (1957).
165 See Larson, Development of Water Rights & Suggested Improvements

in the Water Law of North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. Rsv. 243, 271 (1962);
Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MT. L. Rsv. 133,
159 (1955).
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value product than industry; in others, the reverse may be true. Or
power may have a higher marginal value product than one industry, but not another. And irrigation may be above, below, or between power and industry in marginal value productivity. 166
The state of Washington has eliminated statutory preferences
in favor of a court procedure which provides for determination of
the preference issue in each individual case. 167 Nebraska would do
166 Uses for irrigation and industry, where there is no substitute for water,

should also take precedence over uses such as power and commercial
navigation for which substitutes can be found. Ibid. But substituta-

bility and marginal value productivity analyses must be modified if
supplementary or complementary relationships are found. Enterprises
are supplementary if, with resources constant, the output of one can

be increased without affecting the other. An increase in power production, for example, may have no impact, detrimental or beneficial,
on the use of water for irrigation, manufacturing, or any other purpose.
Enterprises are complementary if, with resources constant, an increase
in the output of one will also result in an increase in the output of the
other. The aforementioned increase in power production, for example,

might actually benefit another use such as irrigation by raising the
stream level and concentrating a large quantity of water in one location.
From an economic standpoint nonconsumptive supplementary and
complementary water uses should be encouraged, irrespective of the
marginal value productivity of such uses or the availability of alternative sources of production. But the latter considerations should
be determinative whenever uses are competitive and consumptive. See
HEADY, EcoNoIVIcs OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION & RESOURcE USE 22134 (4th ed. 1961).
167

See Fisher, supra note 164, at 126-27; Ciriacy-Wantrup, Some Economic Issues in Water Rights, 37 J. FARM EcoN. 875, 881 (Dec. 1955). Ciria-

cy-Wantrup points out that a fairly good economic argument could be
made in favor of a reversal of the usual statutory ranking which places
agriculture above industry, recreation, power, and other uses. The
average value product of consumptive use is far higher in industry
than in agriculture. Since a reversal would, however, merely impose
further rigidities and would not be politically feasible, he advocates

use of the Washington procedure.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.040 (1962) reads as follows: "The
beneficial use of water is hereby declared to be a public use, and any
person may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property or rights now or hereafter existing when found necessary for the

storage of water for, or the application of water to, any beneficial use,
including the right to enlarge existing structures employed for the

public purposes mentioned in this chapter and use the same in common
with the former owner, and including the right and power to condemn
an inferior use of water for a superior use. In condemnation proceed-

ings the court shall determine what use will be for the greatest public

benefit, and that use shall be deemed a superior one: Provided, That
no property right in water or the use of water shall be acquired hereunder by condemnation for irrigation purposes, which shall deprive
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well to follow the Washington lead, except that the decision should
be made by the Department of Water Resources, with appeal to the
68
state supreme court.1
Preference decisions should be based on the economic princi169
ples delineated below.
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any person of such quantity of water as may be reasonably necessary
for the irrigation of his land then under irrigation to the full extent
of the soil, by the most economical method of artificial irrigation applicable to such land according to the usual methods of artificial irrigation
employed in the vicinity where such land is situated. In any case, the
court shall determine what is the most economical method of irrigation.
Such property or rights shall be acquired in the manner provided by
law for the taking of private property for public use by private corporations."
For an excellent coverage of the preference problem see Marquis,
Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws in the
Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797, 835 (1955).
See Timmons, Theoretical Considerations of Water Allocation Among
Competing Uses & Users, 38 J. FAnm EcoN. 1244, 1251-54 (Dec. 1956),
for a more detailed explanation of this graph.
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DD' in economic parlance is a production possibilities curve.
It indicates that a certain quantity of water applied to a given
amount of other resources (land, labor, and capital) can be used
to produce either OD of electricity or OD' of corn. The respective
prices of corn and electricity can then be used to determine how
much water should be devoted to each product. CC is a price line
representing a relatively high price for electricity. The point of
tangency to the production possibilities curve (R) shows that in
such a price situation most of the water should be used for power
production. The price line EE, on the other hand, is more nearly
vertical, and thus represents a price ratio which is more favorable
to corn. As a result the point of tangency shifts to S, and more
17 0
of the water supply should be devoted to irrigation.
Again, it must be conceded that practical application of a
theoretical model is not easy. The Department of Water Resources
cannot increase or decrease permits with every change in product
price. But in a given dispute, on a given day, this theoretical concept is useful. If it is ignored, decisions will be noneconomic in
nature and gross inefficiencies will arise by pure chance, if for no
other reason. In addition, on many occasions there will be great
differences in marginal value productivity of competing uses. For
example, if one were to substitute certain industries for power in
Figure 3, the point of tangency would be such that irrigation could
171
not compete on an economic basis.
Should the people of Nebraska fear this potential adjustment in
the state's economy? Three factors negate any feeling of undue
concern: (1) The state as a whole will always benefit from the
more efficient use of a natural resource; 172 (2) displaced permit
holders will not suffer because preference adjustments require
compensation; and (3) Nebraska cannot legitimately be classified
as a potential dust bowl-industrial, power, and recreational uses
which have higher marginal productivities than agriculture are
relatively insignificant at the moment. Furthermore, such uses are
virtually nonconsumptive; therefore, even large demands for them
170

A somewhat different presentation of the same principles may be found

171

There is evidence available that some industrial uses are fifty times
more productive than irrigation. See Davis, Water and the Law, in

in

HiRSHLEFER, DE HAVEN, & MILLImAN, WATER SUPPLY
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(1960).

39
(1958). It should not be forgotten that industrial uses which pollute
the water may be more consumptive as well as more productive than
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES & THE LAW

172

irrigation.
Profitable economic adjustments should not be prevented merely by
a human resistance to change.
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will have little impact on the water supply available for irriga73
tion.

H. TRANS-WATERSHED DIVERSIONS
In most western states, water may be appropriated for use outside the watershed in which it naturally flows. 174 Such appropriations are subject to the condition that no injury be inflicted upon
existing rights in the original watershed. 7 5 Though this rule is
almost universal, Nebraska supposedly stands as an exception
thereto. 1 Because of the great potential impact that trans-watershed diversions might have on the state, the Nebraska law deserves
much closer scrutiny than has thus far been given it.
Section 46-206 of the Nebraska statutes provides:
The water appropriated from a river or stream shall not be turned
or permitted to run into the waters or channel of any other river
or stream than that from which it is taken or appropriated, unless
such stream exceeds in width one hundred feet, in which event not
more than
seventy-five per cent of the regular flow shall be
7
taken.17
Section 46-265 of the Nebraska statutes provides:
The owner or owners of any irrigation ditch or canal .

.

. shall

return the unused water from such ditch or canal with as little
waste thereof as possible to the17stream
from which such water was
8
taken, or to the Missouri River.
In 1936, the Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District applied for an appropriation of 600,000 acre-feet of water from
the Platte River. Sixty per cent of this was to be transported out
of the Platte watershed into the basins of the Blue and Republican
Rivers. Despite the vociferous objections of downstream appropriators and riparians, the Department of Roads and Irrigation
This is the most important point. Fears that economic change is imminent are almost never justified. The shift in Nebraska from an agricultural to an industrial economy will not take place overnight, if it
ever takes place at all. Any such adjustment will be gradual. Furthermore, many industries will prefer ground water sources to the use of
streamflow; and many others will not require a water supply at all,
except for ordinary needs.
'74 See Trelease, supra note 164, at 304; Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water
Rights Doctrines & Their Implications for River Basin Development,
22 LAw & CO=TEMP. PROB. 276, 283 (1957). In Texas a permit is required. See TEx. REv. Cir. STAT. art. 7590 (1948).
'75 Hutchins & Steele, supra note 174, at 283.
176 Trelease, supra note 164, at 304.
177 NEsB. REv. STAT. § 46-206 (Reissue 1960).
178 NuB. REV. STAT. § 46-265 (Reissue 1960). (Emphasis added.)
173
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found: 179 (1) that there were unappropriated waters in the river;
(2) that the contemplated appropriation would not substantially
deplete the ground waters of the Platte Valley; and (3) that approval would not be detrimental to the public welfare.
The case came before the state supreme court in Osterman v.
Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist.18 0 The department's decision
was reversed in what is perhaps one of the most poorly reasoned
opinions ever handed down by the court. 181
Three basic reasons for reversal were given. First, on what
seemed to be emotional rather than legal grounds, the court declared:
It would be a sad commentary on our political organization, upon

the department of roads and irrigation, and upon this reviewing

court, if in rationing this necessity of life this beautiful valley
should be left with a dry river bed and ruined farms, because of
any mistaken theory that the protection of its natural fertility did
not constitute a public interest within the policy of our laws. l8 2

Then the court added:
[A] n additional reason for awarding these riparians the right to ap-

pear in this present proceeding is to be found in their situation. A
peculiarly valuable portion of their lands is ... subirrigation ....
While subterranean channels may not exist or be completely identified, these subterranean waters come to and flow under their lands
from definite sources and en route to definite termini. The lateral
boundaries of this body of water may not be certainly located, but
its existence as a body of water finding its way through the soil of
the riparian land is completely established. We are committed to
the rule: "The owner of land is entitled to appropriate subterranean waters found under his land, but his use thereof must be reasonable, and not
injurious to others who have substantial rights in
183
such waters."'

These combined reasons take issue with the department's finding that unappropriated water was available in the Platte and that
ground water tables would not be appreciably lowered. This is a
question of fact with which the court would not ordinarily be expected to tamper unless the finding were arbitrary or unreason179 Brief for Appellant, vol. 1, p. 27, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power
180

& Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).

181 Brief for Amicus Curiae, vol. 2, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power

& Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 362,
268 N.W. 334, 337 (1936).
183 Id. at 364, 268 N.W. at 338.
182
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able. 8 4 Yet no declaration of arbitrariness is evident in the Osterman holding.
The appellants' brief and the court's opinion have confused the
rules of ground water and riparian watercourse law. The appellants based their argument on the ground water issue of a lowered
water table, but supported it on riparian authority. Of some twenty-four irrigators who testified on behalf of the appellants at the
department's hearing, at least twenty operated farms bordering on
the Platte River. 8 5 Nevertheless, their testimony dealt only secondarily with water levels in the Platte; it was almost exclusively directed to the subirrigation issue. 8 6 Since the best farmland lies
away from the river, 8 7 it seems strange that the testimony of so
many river farmers was presented, particularly since the appellants
alleged that all irrigators within the watershed must be considered riparians.5 5 The first five propositions of law in the appellants' brief are devoted to riparian law; 8 9 yet there are no allegations that these underground waters are part of a subsurface
stream to which riparian rights would attach. 190 Nor are there any
allegations that the principles of ground water law should be applied in the case. In their contention that trans-watershed diversions are prohibited, the appellants cited several riparian cases, 191
184

State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 174, 292 N.W. 239, 246

(1940): "The rule is that where the action of the administrative officer
of the state is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and does not exceed the
duties and powers imposed, this court will not interfere with the findings of fact so made because to that extent they involve an administrative, as distinguished from a judicial function."
-85 Brief for Appellants, vol. 2, pp. 30-126, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub.
Power & Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
186 Ibid.
187 Concomitantly, the greatest damages would also lie away from the river. Much of the land bordering the Platte River in central Nebraska
is in native grass, whereas that farther away from the stream is farmed
intensively. Some of the bordering land is also lowered in value by
alkalinity, a factor which diminishes in significance with geographical
movement away from the stream. In addition, the major concern over
subirrigation arises because of its need in alfalfa production. This area
has become the leading alfalfa producing region of the world. But the
prime concentration of alfalfa production is also away from the river.
188 No authority is provided for this unique contention.
189 Brief for Appellants, supra note 179, at 35.
390 Courts generally attempt to distinguish underground streams, to which
riparian rights attach, from percolating water, to which so-called
ground water rules apply.
191 Cases from Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Jersey, California, and Kansas
are cited. The first three are riparian states, the latter two are hybridized, as is Nebraska.
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but not a single appropriation case that would so hold.
In support of its reasoning, the supreme court cited Olson v.
City of Wahoo,192 a ground water decision that did not deal with
trans-watershed diversions. Never before had the court been presented with the question of trans-watershed diversions of ground
water; yet it did not even discuss the question as such. If the court,
on the other hand, really intended to decide the case on the basis of
vested riparian rights, it ignored a whole body of its own law that
had limited riparians to actions for damages in such situations. 193
The court's third reason for denying the diversion was based
on statutory interpretation involving sections 46-206 and 46-265.
Section 46-206 was enacted in its present form in 1893. It clearly
permits trans-watershed diversions from the state's larger streams.
Section 46-265 was added in 1895 and is consistent with section 46206 in that it provides for the return of surplus waters either to
the stream from which taken or to the Missouri River. The court,
in holding for the appellants, was forced into an interpretational
corner since the surplus from diversions to the Republican and Blue
basins would eventually reach the Missouri. To avoid this, the
court simply declared that the words "or to the Missouri River"
were not applicable in the Osterman case.194 But such a construction leaves section 46-265 prohibiting trans-watershed diversions
and section 46-206 permitting them-an incongruous result.
Perhaps the court reached a proper decision in this case. The
cause for alarm in the Platte Valley was obvious, and this is the
agricultural heart of Nebraska. Furthermore, farmers from one
edge of this broad valley to the other would in all probability have
been damaged, at least to some unknown extent. But if the decision
is correct, the Nebraska statutes unconditionally permitting transwatershed diversions are unconstitutional, and should have been
held unconstitutional.
Apart from the above issue, the case should have been decided
by balancing the equities. If the benefits of this appropriation
were overwhelming in comparison to the damages, it should have
been approved, and those damaged would then have been entitled
to compensation. 95 If, on the other hand, the appellee's equities
were not sufficiently strong to counterbalance the infringement of
vested rights, the reversal was correct.
192
193

194
195

124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933).
See discussion in section HI supra.
Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 368,
268 N.W. 334, 340 (1936).
See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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As might be expected, the court was later forced to retreat from
its position in Ainsworth Irr. Dist. v. Bejot.196 The Ainsworth
project involved damming the Snake River, a tributary of the Niobrara, the intent being to carry the water by canal out of the Snake
watershed into the basin of the Niobrara for the purpose of irrigating some 33,960 acres of land. None of this water was to be returned to the Snake. In Osterman, the court ignored the fact that
the Platte, Blue, and Republican Rivers might all be considered part
of the same watershed, i.e., that of the Missouri. But in Bejot it
had no difficulty at all in determining that the Snake and Niobrara
Rivers were all one watershed. Superficial analysis would indicate
that the difference in the two opinions is merely one of defining
watershed boundaries. But such is not the case at all. The court
balanced equities in Bejot, and in so doing upheld what might just
as well have been construed as a trans-watershed diversion. The
Snake River Valley is not a farming area; subirrigation was not an
issue. And the only two downstream appropriators on the Snake
were small power plants that were to be compensated for any
damages suffered. As a consequence, the proposed diversion would
interfere with no one in the original watershed (the Snake), and
would materially benefit the receiving watershed (the Niobrara).
Under such circumstances diversion is most appropriate.
Sections 46-206 and 46-265 should be redrafted to correct their
susceptibility to constitutional attack. Then the court should clarify its legal reasoning in future cases dealing with this issue. If
this is done, Nebraska will quite likely find that trans-watershed
diversions are not prohibited after all.
I. ADmnusTPATn STkNS
In the near future every state in the nation may have a statutory system of water law. This is a commendable trend, but the
concomitant terminological trend in such statutes is disturbing.
Such words as "reasonable," "public interest," "beneficial use," and
a multitude of others 97 permeate the law and leave tremendous
discretion in administrative agencies.
For example, section 46-233 of the Nebraska statutes provides
that an applicant must prosecute construction of his diversion
196 170 Neb. 257, 102 N.W.2d 416 (1960).
197 "Consumptive use," though not usually a statutory term, has been misunderstood for years. Any use which reduces either the quantity or
quality of water available for subsequent use is consumptive. This
means that municipal or industrial uses which are often categorized
as relatively nonconsumptive may, by polluting a stream, become more
consumptive than irrigation.
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works "vigorously, diligently, and uninterruptedly." But the legislature furnishes no standards by which vigor and diligence can be
measured. And just how is the department to determine when
work has been "interrupted"? Admittedly, legislation must often
be general; a statute cannot be expected to cover every situation.
But can we not do better? 198 Use of the above wording makes
it potentially possible for an administrator to juggle priorities in
response to political or personal pressures. 99 In addition, irrespective of the administrator's integrity and competence, such terminology serves only to breed litigation. 20 0 The Department of Water
Resources has itself sought to avoid some of these potential sources
of conflict by specifying when construction of diversion works is to
begin, when it is to be completed, and when water is to be applied
201
to beneficial use.
Section 46-233 goes on to provide that the department may extend the time for completion of works or the time for application of
water to a beneficial use for a "reasonable" length of time. This
latter subsection merely compounds the ambiguities.
Section 46-240 states that an appropriation cannot exceed the
quantity that experience might indicate as necessary, in the exercise of good husbandry, for the production of crops. What an administrative enigma this must be. Whose experience is to be applied-the irrigator's, the department's, that of a research organization? In what manner is the department to determine what constitutes "good husbandry"?
198 See, e.g., the problems of interpretation that this statute caused in Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 176 Neb. 416, 126 N.W.2d 404
(1964), and North Loup River Pub. Power & Irr. Dist. v. Loup River
Pub. Power Dist., 162 Neb. 22, 74 N.W.2d 863 (1956).
'99

200
201

Nebraska, fortunately, has an outstanding administrator and highly
respected Department of Water Resources. This does not, however,
justify the statutory inadequacies.
See cases cited note 197 supra.
Proposed Surface Water Law for Michigan § 16(b), in THE LAW OF
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 49, 56 (1958), provides that permits will specify the period within which: (1) construction shall be commenced; (2) construction shall be completed; (3)
beneficial use of water shall be commenced; and (4) initial irrigation
of the estimated maximum acreage irrigable in one year shall be completed.
The statute goes on to provide that, within the above time limits,
construction must proceed with reasonable diligence or the permit
may be cancelled even before the times specified above are reached.
This procedure gives the administrator much more definitive contro. than is found in most such statutes.
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Some of the newer statutes use the term "highest beneficial
use,120 2 but do not bother to declare how such is to be determined.
administrator is charged with
And inevitably, as a catch-all, 20the
3
protecting the "public interest.1

Water administrators should not have to be subjected to the
20 4
kind of pressures that are inherent in these nebulous statutes.
Neither should they have to bear the burden and responsibility of
presumed omniscience. 20 5 Professor Beuscher, in a study of midwestern water law, expressed his views on this question as follows:
One of the factors contributing to the importance of administrative
interpretations, rule-making, adjudications and other activities in
the water regulatory field ... is a shocking sloppiness in ...
drafting .... Probably the presence of vague, poorly thought out

water statutes is another evidence that up to the present water has
been. . plentiful and the problems of... allocation ... have not

been acute. Because of this sloppiness, however, the work and responsibility of the agency charged with the administration of the
poorly drawn statutes increases. Questions that should have
been answered by the legislator . . . are left for the administrators .... 200

It is to be hoped that new statutes coming into existence in the
202

The Model Water Use Act, in UNivmsrzY OF MIcmaHA LAw SCHOOL,
541, 557 (1958), provides that the commission established therein shall regulate surface water so as to obtain
"the most beneficial" use of water within the state.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-235 (Reissue 1960): "If there is unappropriated
water in the source of supply named in the application, and if such
application and appropriation when perfected is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, the Department of Water Resources shall
WATER RESOURCES & THE LAW

203

"
(Emphasis added.)
approve the same ....
204 HIRsHLEIFER, DE HAVEN, & MIwLEAN, WATER SUPPLY

205

84 (1960):

"The

danger of misuse of power will be greater the wider the discretionary
authority given the agency, and the broader the scope of its activities."
See discussion by Wolman in THE LAw OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE
EASTERN UNITED STATES 65 (1958).
The following statement is also appropriate: "Regardless of the extent of the authority conferred upon the State administrator, his job
will be more clearly defined, and his orders and decisions more
soundly based, if there is a statutory declaration of general policies
as to water rights and regulation of development." Thomas, Hydrology vs. Water Allocation in the Eastern United States, in THE

LAW OF
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 165, 176 (1958).
206 BEUSCHER, PART VI, A FOuR-STATE ComPARATIvE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
PRIVATE & PUBLIC RiGHTS IN WATER & OF THE LEVELS & AGENcIEs OF
GovERNmENT THAT ENUNCIATED THEM 148 (Phase Report No. 21, 1961).

This was a report under a contract between the University of Wisconsin
and the USDA for a study of legal and economic aspects of water rights
in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio.
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East will be
more than adapted paraphrases of western appropria7
tion law.
J.

20

CONCLUSION

The intent of the preceding discussion has been to discover appropriate means whereby economic principles may more effectively be integrated into the legal-administrative framework of
Nebraska watercourse law. Among the major recommendations
are:
1. An increased recognition of the economics discipline by administrators and courts.
2. A reduction of pre-1895 appropriation and riparian rights
to amounts actually being used by the holders of such rights.
3. Repeal of statutory quantity limitations so that permits for
competitive, consumptive uses may be granted on a marginal value
productivity basis.
4. The discarding of all vestiges of the pro rata principle inherent in riparian law.
5. Authorization of the voluntary use of rotation systems.
6. Authorization of temporary and seasonal appropriations.
7. Repeal of the provision restricting water rights to specific
tracts of land.
8. Authorization of transfers between uses and between users
except where detrimental to the public interest or violative of
vested rights.20 8

207

208

Larson, Development of Water Rights & Suggested Improvements in
the Water Law of North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. REv. 243, 270-71 (1962),
commented on the use of terms such as "beneficial use," "willful
waste," and "public interest" in the relatively new North Dakota statute as follows: "These statutory directions are clearly inadequate to
give more than the vaguest criteria by which to judge between competing uses of water. To the extent that any conflict develops over allocation of water rights, additional guides are needed if the standard of
greatest utilization of water resources is to be realized."
If transferability is not permitted, at least some flexibility could be
achieved by granting appropriations for specific time periods, rather
than in perpetuity. The period should be sufficient to permit full
amortization of the proposed investment. See Fisher, Western Experience & Eastern Appropriation Proposals,in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNrrED STATES 75, 133 (1958); Harr & Gordon,
Legislative Change of Water Law in Massachusetts, in id. at 1, 38;
Model Water Use Act § 406, in UNnMRSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL,
WATER RESOURCES & TE LAW 574 (1958) (fifty year permit); CiriacyWantrup, Some Economic Issues in Water Rights, 37 J. FA~uv Ecox.
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9. Development of a master plan for use of the state's water
resources, 20 9 such plan to give the Department of Water Resources
guidance in the realm of "public interest," and to indicate wherein
a market might be permitted to function within an administrative
framework.
10. Clarification of the state's forfeiture statute.
11. Application of the balancing of the equities doctrine to
upstream junior-downstream senior conflicts.
12. Removal of both the statutory and constitutional provisions on preferences. Determination of such use conflicts by the
Department of Water Resources on the basis of economic considerations within a public interest framework.
In the absence of this, enactment of a statute specifically granting private individuals and firms the right to condemn senior water
rights of a lower preference.
13. Use of the balancing of the equities doctrine in trans-watershed cases. Amendment of the watershed diversion statutes to
remedy their constitutional defects.

209

875, 880 (Dec. 1955). See also IowA COD. ANx. § 455A.20 (1963) (ten
year maximum often too short for amortization).
A word of caution provided by Dr. Robert C. Otte might be apropos
here: "[I] wonder if we should not pause in our headlong plunge
into increasingly complex organization and planning and ask ourselves, 'Is this trip really necessary?' . . .
"Considering the whole field of land and water use, could we not
invest more research and intellectual effort in developing alternatives
which are less cumbersome organizationally and which rely more on the
unencumbered actions of individuals? A look at our problems in land
and water use does not bring to mind many good examples where we
could move in the direction of more laissez faire within a general
legal and institutional framework; but how hard have we been looking?" Otte, Discussion: New Approaches in Organizing for Land &
Water Use, 44 3. FARm EcoN. 1694, 1695-96 (Dec. 1962).
But cf. BEUSCHER, op. cit. supra note 206, at 154: "In each state the
legislature has made a bow toward the need for broad-based water
resource planning but funds and staff are lacking. The principal water
regulatory agencies in the four states have staffs hardly adequate for
the accomplishment of the day-to-day regulatory responsibilities assigned to them by the legislature. These people have little or no time
left for the time-consuming and expensive basic studies and analysis
essential to the setting of major goals for water use and development
in the future."
These two statements are not at all incompatible. Water resource
planning does not necessarily entail the conceptualization of new administrative hierarchies.
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14. A general overhaul of all ambiguous water statutes in an
210
effort to secure a more precise declaration of legislative intent.
15. Increased appropriations for the Department of Water Resources so that it may more effectively carry out its statutory
responsibilities.
Though this article has been critical of some aspects of Nebraska watercourse law, its purpose is not negative. In a changing
world, a utopian system for the administration of any natural resource is but a dream. Conversely though, we must never settle
for the status quo. Our goals in water administration, like those
in our personal lives, should be just out of reach-not too far, lest
we become discouraged, and not too close, lest we become complacent.

210

Because of length considerations, no attention has been given in this
article to the interrelationships of surface water and ground water
law. Quite obviously this cannot long be postponed. Nebraska already has more than 25,000 irrigation wells, many of which are directly affecting streamflow. A 1963 statute declares that the pumping of
water from pits located within 50 feet of the bank of a natural stream
may have a direct effect on its surface flow and that, therefore, a
permit to so pump must be obtained from the Department of Water
Resources. Neb. Laws c. 274, p. 827 (1963). In deciding whether or
not to grant the permit the department must consider its effect on
streamflow, and the ability of the stream to meet prior appropriation
requirements. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 174, at 297, and
Trelease, supra note 164, at 311, for comments recognizing this problem. Professor Richard Harnsberger of the University of Nebraska
College of Law will deal with the issue in detail in a future article to
be devoted to a model ground water statute.

